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“He told me what could be worse is if he killed all of us, and then  
he said actually worse than that, if he killed the children and not  
me so that I would have to live without them.”1 
 
The court-appointed evaluator and Maryland family court did  
not believe Dr. Amy Castillo’s report of her husband’s words  
or did not take them seriously.  When Dr. Castillo refused to  
turn the children over for court-ordered visitation with their  
father, she was held in contempt and jailed. Months later, having 
learned her lesson, she let them go with their father.  That day, 
March 29, 2008, he drowned Anthony (6), Austin (4) and Athena (2) 
in the bathtub, one at a time, in the hotel room he used for the visit. 
 
While the outcome of the above case was extreme,2 the court’s 
dismissive response to the mother’s desperate warning was quite typical.  
Over the past 20-30 years a critical mass of research and social media has 
described family courts in private custody litigation denying and punishing 
of women’s and children’s abuse allegations, often with a custody reversal to 
the alleged abuser.3  In particular, the literature has condemned courts’ use of 
the controversial concept of parental alienation4 to dismiss mothers’ abuse 
allegations. This qualitative literature has been largely ignored or 
marginalized by leading mainstream family law scholars and family court 
 
1 Family Law – Protective Orders – Burden of Proof:  Hearing on H.B. 700 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2010 Leg., 427th Sess. (Md. 2010) (statement of Amy Castillo), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/metro/pdf/HB_700_Testimony_Amy_Castillo.pdf. 
2 But cf. US Divorce Child Murder Data/Reported System Failures, CTR. FOR JUD. 
EXCELLENCE, https://centerforjudicialexcellence.org/cje-projects-initiatives/child-murder-
data/ (last visited January 30, 2021) (listing 106 “preventable homicides” in which courts 
were asked to restrict a parent’s access but refused) (hereafter “Child murder data”). 
3 See Part I, infra.  
4 Parental alienation lacks a singular definition but is generally understood as toxic behavior 
by a parent to undermine the children’s relationship with the other parent.  It is typically 
invoked whenever children resist contact with a (usually noncustodial) parent.  See Part IV, 
infra.   




professionals. While the reasons for this marginalization are complex and 
likely partially unintentional, this article is a call to bring family violence in 
from the margins of judicial, policy and academic attention. The article 
grounds that call in new empirical data from the first-ever quantitative 
national analysis of family court practices - data which empirically validates 
the reports and grievances of thousands of mothers and children in the United 
States.5   
 
It is no secret within the family law world that family courts idealize 
shared parenting and prioritize it in custody determinations; but the degree to 
which the shared parenting ideal undermines consideration of family violence 
has not been widely recognized.  Rather, family law, in both theory and 
practice, treats domestic violence and child abuse as exceptions to the norm 
and rarely legitimate, despite longstanding empirical evidence suggesting 
such histories are common in custody cases.6 This marginalization and denial 
of family violence in law, theory and practice fuels and reinforces custody 
courts’ denials of abuse and disfavoring of mothers who report it.  This 
critique has been amply articulated in domestic violence and abuse 
scholarship and literature but ignored in mainstream family law scholarship. 
 
 This article argues that domestic violence and child maltreatment 
(together termed “family violence”) need to be brought in from the margins 
of family law discourse to change the profession’s systemic denials of the 
risks many children face from a custody-litigating parent.  For the first time 
we now have empirical evidence that validates the domestic violence field’s 
critiques. The new study’s objective data put a point on the cognitive 
dissonance between the domestic violence field’s critiques of family courts 
and mainstream family law and scholarship.  
 
5 Documentation of the Study data and methods is posted at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/, 
and will be referred to herein as “Statistical Documentation.”     
6 Regarding rates of abuse allegations in custody cases and other families, see Part I, infra. 
Some might argue that because the empirical data reflects only judicial decisions, this article 
has limited significance because only approximately 4-6% of filed custody cases are 
ultimately decided by a judge. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING 
THE CHILD:  SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 150 (1994). Part I infra, however, 
explains why this article is pertinent to most contested cases, including those that settle out 
of court  




The article then turns to the question the data beg:  Why are mothers’ 
claims of abuse so widely denied in court?  In addition to common 
explanations such as emphasis on shared parenting, gender bias and 
misconceptions about abuse, it suggests another less recognized cause - 
unconscious psychological denial. Only unconscious denial can explain the 
commonality of court decisions which are both illogical and counter-factual, 
especially from respected judges.   
 
Finally, the article urges changes in both the theory and practice of 
family law.  It proposes two new modifications to custody statutes designed 
to counteract the types of reasoning and practices which fuel denial of  
credible abuse claims, in particular the role of parental alienation theory.  It 
also urges scholars and law professors to support the integration of the 
realities of family violence into family law scholarship and practice. As 
trainers and mentors of new family law professionals and significant 
contributors to shaping both the law and judicial practice, family law scholars 
have power to help turn the tide of destructive family court outcomes.   
 
 Part I below draws from a case narrative and extensive scholarship 
and social media reports to depict family courts’ common rejections of 
mothers’ evidence of family violence.  It then presents data from the author’s 
first-ever national empirical study of family court cases involving abuse and 
parental alienation claims (the “Study”).7  The Study’s findings confirm that 
family courts reject mothers’ allegations of abuse by fathers at high rates and 
frequently remove mothers’ custody, validating the domestic violence critical 
narratives and scholarship.   
 
 Part II describes the marginalization of family violence within 
mainstream family law and leading family law scholarship, with particular 
 
7 The final report for the funder can be found at Joan Meier et al, Child Custody Outcomes 
in Cases Involving Parental Alienation and Abuse Allegations,  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3448062 (hereafter “Child Custody 
Outcomes” or “the Study”).  A portion of the Study’s findings related to alienation were 
published in Joan Meier, U.S. child custody outcomes in cases involving parental alienation 
and abuse allegations, 42(1) J. Soc. Welf. & Fam. Law 92 (2020).  But the majority of the 
data included herein has not previously been published. 




attention to the shared custody idealism which shapes both.  It also explains 
why, while the Study’s data reflect only the small number of cases involving 
final adjudications, the larger critique is pertinent more broadly to cases 
which settle out of court and even some informally resolved cases.  
 
Part III contrasts the widespread denial of family violence in family 
courts with the palpable shifts toward greater societal recognition of men’s 
abuse of women ushered in by the #MeToo movement.  Other scholars have 
suggested a number of causes for courts’ and practitioners’ rejection of 
mothers’ abuse claims; this article explores a less visible and potentially more 
fundamental cause – the phenomenon of psychological denial.  Individual 
and social denial of many humanly inflicted traumas, including not only 
violence against women and children but also political- and war-traumas, has 
been explicated and detailed in significant social science research.8  Western 
society at large has recently begun to shed the denial of men’s sexual abuse 
in response to the #MeToo movement, which has successfully brought abuse 
of women in employment into stark relief, although the implications of this 
new awareness remain highly contested even in the employment context.9  In 
the family courts, where - unlike non-legal settings - both the facts and the 
consequences must be authoritatively decided, the cumulative forces favoring 
denial of family abuse still deter many courts from validating and acting on 
the implications of women’s and children’s abuse claims.     
 
Part IV then elaborates on the “machinery” of courts’ denial, the 
widely accepted quasi-scientific notion of parental alienation (“PA”).  The 
PA concept invites courts to view mothers’ abuse allegations as a product of 
– at best - mothers’ pathology or excessive “gatekeeping” toward ex-partners 
they no longer love or trust - and at worst - of malice and vengeance. Without 
directly ruling out or confirming abuse, PA thinking deflects courts’ attention 
 
8 See JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 28-32 (photo. reprint 1997) (1992) 
(analogizing society’s early refusal to recognize and compassionately treat “shell-shock,” to 
society’s cyclical denial of the “war between the sexes”).  
9 See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Case of Al Franken, THE NEW YORKER, Jul. 29, 2019, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/07/29/the-case-of-al-franken (quoting lawyer 
Debra Katz stating “[a]ll offensive behavior should be addressed, but not all offensive 
behavior warrants the most severe sanction”).   




away from women’s and children’s abuse allegations and encourages them 
to essentially shoot the messenger.  Despite the known lack of scientific 
support for key tenets of PA theory, judicial trainings on it are ubiquitous, 
family court conferences feature it, an extensive literature extolls it, and it 
permeates family court litigation.  And even where alienation is not explicitly 
invoked, the ideology reinforces family court culture’s reification of shared 
parenting while promoting punitive responses toward women who impede 
this goal by alleging abuse.  The use and power of PA to fuel the rejection of 
abuse claims is now empirically proven by the Study’s findings that fathers’ 
crossclaims of PA virtually double the rates at which courts deny mothers’ 
abuse claims and remove custody of their children.  
 
Finally, Part V calls for a two-tiered legislative response and a new 
academic synthesis. First, laws governing custody should ensure that parental 
alienation is cabined and constrained so it cannot be used to short-circuit 
abuse investigations and brush aside children’s reported experiences and 
feelings.  While courts must of course remain free to reject the truth of any 
abuse allegations, PA is not a scientifically legitimate tool for that purpose, 
and it is framed and used in a manner that simply cements pre-existing 
predilections toward disbelief of women’s and children’s claims of abuse.  
Expert testimony in such cases must be limited to genuine experts in abuse – 
not alienation - and alienation claims by an accused parent should not be 
considered unless abuse has been ruled out.   
 
Second, the law needs to change courts’ zero-sum approach to abuse 
allegations, i.e., the presumption that “if it is not true, then it is false.”  Given 
that not all true abuse (particularly child sexual abuse) is easily proven, and 
given human nature’s avoidance of such painful realities, the law should 
recognize the need for - and require courts to employ - a nuanced response in 
situations of indeterminacy:  Wherever a court is not prepared to rule 
affirmatively on abuse, but it has not been ruled out, the court should assign 
therapeutic support from trauma professionals for both the child and the 
rejected parent.  Such interventions should respond to children’s actual 
feelings and felt experiences and should aid a disfavored parent in cultivating 
a loving and safe relationship with their child, rather than either forcing or 




eliminating parent-child contact based simply on whether abuse is fully 
proven or not.10   
 
The article closes with a plea to the family law academy to bring 
family violence in from the margins of scholarly research and theorizing, to 
ensure that students learn the realities of family court adjudications of cases 
involving abuse and are prepared for the battles ahead.   
 
I. THE ERASURE OF ABUSE IN FAMILY COURT  
 
The Gs’ custody litigation had three stages – two are described here: 
The parties met when Ms. G was 18 and in high school, and Mr. G 
was 30.  Nine years into the marriage they were divorcing and 
contesting custody of the parties’ two sons and one daughter.  Mr. 
G’s frequent verbal abuse of Ms. G was admitted.  Both the children 
and Ms. G lived in fear of Mr. G.  While Mr. G had previously 
admitted to “battering. . . hitting . . . [and] slapping her. . .” and the 
neutral evaluator reported that he admitted to having “hit” her 4-5 
times, at trial he asserted that she always hit him first.  He did 
however admit to having grabbed and shaken his wife by the head 
while screaming “shut up shut up shut up!” in her face.  The previous 
couple therapist corroborated his verbal aggression toward his wife 
and expressed the view that he had likely physically abused her more 
than the five times Ms. G reported.  A police report describing Mr. 
G’s fairly recent hospitalization for a deliberate overdose was 
admitted. 
 
The court-appointed evaluator was not receptive to Ms. G’s 
descriptions of Mr. G’s family violence, and without reviewing any 
corroborative evidence, concluded that the children were not 
“currently” afraid of their father.  The court-appointed guardian ad 
litem declined to discuss abuse but did raise the fact that Ms. G owed 
her fees from the first trial.  Both neutral appointees viewed Ms. G as 
an inadequate parent with two hard-to-control boys, and 
 
10 See infra, Part V. 




recommended continued physical custody of all three children with 
Mr. G.  The court also characterized Ms. G as having emotional 
problems.  Despite the corroboration described above, including 
testimony from past counselors, the uncontested fact that the family 
repeatedly sought treatment for family abuse, and even the neutral 
evaluator’s statement that Ms. G “was a victim of domestic violence,” 
the court stated in 2010: “[i]f all this abuse happened as you testified, 
ma’am, I’m shocked that there is not any corroborative evidence of 
it.” The judge awarded physical custody to Mr. G, who moved them 
to Tokyo.   
 
After four more years of living with their father in Tokyo, in 2015, 
during a summer visit with their mother, the children reported 
ongoing physical and emotional abuse.  One child told his mother 
about his plans to commit suicide if forced to go back to his father.  
The Virginia Commonwealth University Child Protection Team 
interviewed the children, diagnosed one child with post-traumatic-
stress-disorder and recommended a “full [child welfare] 
assessment.” In the emergency court hearing, the 14-year-old 
daughter testified in Chambers about the physical abuse at home.  At 
the subsequent hearing, Mr. G admitted that the Japanese school had 
called him in after seeing one child’s bruises, to tell him to cease 
using physical “discipline.”  The same custody evaluator now found 
the children were “highly stressed,” acting out, and had 
uncontrollable tics, but felt this was not an emergency nor raised 
anything new.  The same judge again ruled that “the court finds that 
there is no abuse of the children and no history of family abuse,” and 
ordered custody to remain with the father.11 
 
11 See Brief Amici Curiae of DV LEAP et al in support of Appellant, Mrs. G v. Mr. G, (Va. 
App.) (2011).  A fourth custody round, triggered by the father’s secret and unlawful move 
with the children to the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), produced the same result.  Brief of 
Appellant, (Va. App.) (2015), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1C3khVMAttSTQtVTsf7N8TG1lzy1IjJqm/view. In her 
final year of high school the oldest daughter refused to return to her father from her 
summer visit with her mother, spent her senior year with her mother in the U.S., and is 
currently enrolled in college in the U.S.  A year later, one son remains with his mother after 
his 2019 summer visit, due to suicidality, requiring a month in full-time mental health care.   




A. Qualitative Research and Narratives 
 
Narratives like the G case are regularly echoed by thousands of 
professionals and parents throughout the country. Thousands of self-
described “protective parents”12 share their struggles in court on social media,  
and a growing body of scholarship describes similar cases, while critiquing 
family courts.13 Domestic violence organizations such as the Domestic 
Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV LEAP)14 are 
regularly flooded with pleas for help from battered women litigating custody, 
reporting that judges and court-appointed custody evaluators reject their 
claims of abuse and seek to maximize fathers’ access to children instead.15 
Over the past 14 years an annual national conference has brought together 
protective mothers wrestling with the family courts.16 
 
The third child remained with his father in the UAE.  Electronic communications from Ms. 
G to Joan Meier (January 6, March 9, 2020).   
12 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA PROTECTIVE PARENT ASSOCIATION, 
https://www.caprotectiveparents.org/; CENTER FOR JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE, 
centerforjudicialexcellence.org; ONE MOM’S BATTLE, 
https://www.onemomsbattle.com/blog/; THE COURT SAID, https://www.thecourtsaid.org.    
Localized activist efforts have had piecemeal success.  See CTR. FOR JUD. EXCELLENCE, CA 
COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE AUDIT & REFORM, 
https://centerforjudicialexcellence.org/cje-projects-initiatives/ca-commission-on-judicial-
performance-audit-reform/ (concerted effort by several California groups resulted in 
legislative mandate for audit of state family courts’ performance). 
13 See citations infra at notes 18-21.   
14 In 2003 the author founded - and until late 2019 served as Director and/or Legal Director 
of - the Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (DV LEAP).  DV 
LEAP’s mission is to provide appellate advocacy in cases involving domestic violence or 
family abuse or of importance to those constituencies.  For more information go to 
www.dvleap.org. 
15 Although I no longer work with DV LEAP, I continue to receive 5-10 emails and calls per 
month from (mostly) mothers desperate for assistance to undo or prevent court decisions 
putting their children in harm’s way.   
16 But for the pandemic, 2020 would have been the Battered Mothers’ Custody 
Conference’s 15th annual conference.  See 
https://www.batteredmotherscustodyconference.org/.   




The importance of adult domestic violence for custody determinations 
was first addressed in legal scholarship decades ago;17 and since the early 
2000s, domestic violence professors, lawyers and researchers have been 
reporting the failure of family courts to act on that link.18  Experts and 
 
17 See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women:  The Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (1991). 
18 For just some examples of the critical literature, see Debra Pogrund Stark, Jessica M. 
Choplin & Sarah Elizabeth Wellard, Properly Accounting for Domestic Violence in Child 
Custody Cases:  An Evidence-Based Analysis and Reform Proposal, 26 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 1 (2019) (describing ideological battle between fathers’ rights and domestic violence 
advocates over custody adjudication, analyzing social science research, and concluding that 
courts are more protective of fathers’ rights than survivors of abuse and recommending 
legislative changes); Rita Berg, Parental Alienation Analysis, Domestic Violence, and 
Gender Bias in Minnesota Courts, 29  L. & INEQ. 5 (2011) (discussing 18 Minnesota cases 
involving domestic violence and parental alienation); MIKE BRIGNER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 
ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY:  LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES 13-1, 13-12 to 13-14 
(Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) (parents expressing concern about child 
safety with the other parent in state courts are routinely labeled an “unfriendly parent,” 
“uncooperative,” and/or guilty of “parental alienation); SHARON ARAJI ET AL, DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY:  LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES, 6-2, 6-7 
(Mo Therese Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) (describing five separate state-based 
studies of Child Custody Outcomes  in cases involving domestic violence finding that 
domestic violence rarely resulted in protective or limited parenting time); Dana Harrington 
Conner, Abuse and Discretion:  Evaluating Judicial Discretion in Custody Cases Involving 
Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 163 (2009) (describing 
problematic exercises of judicial discretion in custody cases involving domestic violence and 
calling for less deference on appellate review); Michelle Bemiller, When Battered Mothers 
Lose Custody:  A Qualitative Study of Abuse at Home and In the Court, 5 J. CHILD CUSTODY 
228 (2008) (discussing 16 Ohio cases and finding denial of due process, gender bias and 
corruption led to maternal losses of custody); AMY NEUSTEIN & MICHAEL LESHER, FROM 
MADNESS TO MUTINY:  WHY MOTHERS ARE RUNNING FROM THE FAMILY COURTS – AND 
WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2005) (documenting cases in which accusations of child 
sexual abuse resulted in forced contact with the alleged abuser, and sometimes complete 
termination of parental contact with a loving parent who seeks to protect the child); Mary A. 
Kernic et al., Children in the Crossfire:  Child Custody Determinations Among Couples With 
a History of Intimate Partner Violence, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 991 (2005) (mothers 
in cases with a violent partner were no more likely to obtain custody than mothers in non-
abuse cases; fathers with a history of committing abuse were denied visitation in only 17% 
of cases); Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives:  The Battered Mothers’ Testimony 
Project, Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 Ariz. St. L J. 709 (2007)(arguing that 
battered mothers’ narratives are as essential as data for making change, but were dismissed 
by the courts due to gender bias). See also Mary Przekop, One More Battleground:  Domestic 




researchers have reported that many custody courts fail to acknowledge 
domestic violence or child abuse, and are often driven by myths and 
misconceptions about perpetrators and victims.19  Others have pointed out 
that family courts often fail to understand the implications of domestic 
violence for children and parenting,20 are awarding unfettered access or 
custody to abusive fathers,21 and even cutting children completely off from 
their protective mothers.22  These draconian responses are particularly 
 
Violence, Child Custody, and the Batterer’s Relentless Pursuit of Their Victim Through the 
Courts, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 1053 (2011); Joan Meier, Domestic Violence, Child 
Custody and Child Protection: Understanding Judicial Resistance and Imagining the 
Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 657 (2003).   
19 Peter G. Jaffe, Claire V. Crooks & Samantha E. Poisson, Common Misconceptions in 
Addressing Domestic Violence in Child Custody Disputes, 54 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 57, 60, 62 
(2003); Stephanie J. Dallam & Joyana L. Silberg, Six Myths that Place Children at Risk in 
Custody Disputes, 7 FAM. & INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE Q. 65 (2014); Rita Smith & 
Pamela Coukos, Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluations of Domestic Violence and Child 
Abuse in Custody Determinations, 36 JUDGES J. 38 (1997). 
20 Evan Stark, Rethinking Custody Evaluations in Cases Involving Domestic Violence, 6 J. 
CHILD CUSTODY 287 (2009); Clare Dalton, Susan Carbon & Nancy Olesen, High Conflict 
Divorce, Violence, and Abuse:  Implications for Custody and Visitation Decisions, 54 JUV. 
& FAM. CT. J. 11 (2003); Meier, supra note 19.   
21 LUNDY BANCROFT, JAY G. SILVERMAN & DANIEL RITCHIE, THE BATTERER AS PARENT:  
ADDRESSING THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS (2d ed. 2012); 
Gina Kaysen Fernandes, Custody Crisis:  Why Moms are Punished in Court, MOMLOGIC, 
www.momlogic.com/2010/01/custody_crisis_why_mothers_are_punished_in_family_court
.php (last visited April 21, 2014); Sally Goldfarb, The Legal Response to Violence Against 
Women in the United States of America:  Recent Reforms and Continuing Challenge:  
Expert Paper prepared for the United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women 
(Apr. 14, 2014) (expert paper provided to United Nations) (on file with United Nations), 
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/vaw_legislation_2008/expertpapers/EGMGPL
VAW%20Paper%20(Sally%20Goldfarb).pdf; Meier, supra note 19 at 662, n.19, Appendix 
(of 38 appealed custody and domestic violence cases, 36 involved award of joint or sole 
custody to an alleged or adjudicated batterer; 2/3 were reversed on appeal).   
22 See, e.g., Joan Meier, Getting Real About Abuse and Alienation:  A Critique of Drozd 
and Olesen’s Decision Tree, 7 J. CHILD CUSTODY 219, 228-29 (2010) (describing five such 
cases); Poster presentation by Nancy Stuebner, Linda Krajewski & Geraldine Stahly at the 
Int’l Violence and Trauma Conf., https://irp-
cdn.multiscreensite.com/0dab915e/files/uploaded/IVAT%20Poster%202014.pdf (2014) 
(75% of mothers in survey lost custody to abusers); Neustein & Lesher, supra note 22; 
Dombrowski v. United States, 
http://claudinedombrowski.blogspot.com/2013/08/dombrowski-et-el-v-usa-2007-




apparent where mothers (and children) allege child sexual abuse.23 It is also 
now clear that this pattern of family court resistance to mothers’ pleas to 
protect their children in the context of custody determinations is global.24   
 
 
petition.html (2007) (Petition to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights detailing 
10 cases in which U.S. family courts both suppressed evidence of adult and child abuse and 
awarded custody to abusers).  
23 Kathleen Coulborn Faller & Ellen DeVoe, Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Divorce, 4 J. 
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1 (1995) (some courts sanctioned mothers for reporting child sexual 
abuse, especially those with more corroborative evidence); Neustein & Lesher, supra note 
19; S. R. Lowenstein, Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visitation Litigation:  
Representation for the Benefit of Victims, 60 UMKC L. REV. 227 (1991) (of 36 cases sexual 
abuse cases, 2/3 of the alleged perpetrators received unsupervised visitation and in custody 
cases in which 63% of mothers alleged some kind of abuse, 48% lost custody); Bancroft & 
Miller, supra note 19 at 107-22. See also Madelyn Milchman, Misogyny in New York 
Custody Decisions with Parental Alienation and Child Sexual Abuse Allegations, 14 J. CHILD 
CUSTODY 234 (2017).   
24 See https://www.facebook.com/thecourtsaid/; Elizabeth Sheehy & Simon LaPierre, 
Introduction to the Special Issue, 42 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 1 (2020) (papers from 
Italy, Spain, UK, Canada, U.S., Australia, New Zealand and Wales detail consistent family 
court problems for abused women and harmful impact of parental alienation crossclaims); 
JESS HILL, SEE WHAT YOU MADE ME DO:  POWER, CONTROL AND DOMESTIC ABUSE 
(2019)(describing the problem in Australia); Owen Bowcott, Family courts not safe for 
domestic violence victims, lawyers say, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 19, 2020),  
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2020/feb/19/family-courts-not-safe-for-domestic-
violence-victims-lawyers-say (letter signed by 130 legal professionals describes UK 
pattern of not understanding or appropriately responding to family violence); Sigri Sigrun 
Joelsdottir & Grant Wyeth, The Misogynist Violence of Iceland’s Feminist Paradise,  
Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/15/the-misogynist-violence-of-icelands-
feminist-paradise/ (July 15, 2020); MICHELLE LEFEVRE & JERI DAMMAN, WHAT IS THE 
EXPERIENCE OF LAWYERS WORKING IN PRIVATE LAW CHILDREN CASES? (2019), 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=pd12-report-of-survey-final-
11th-feb-2020.pdf&site=387 (survey in Sussex, UK, finds courts avoid and ignore family 
violence allegations, and refuse to hold evidentiary hearings despite legal directive to do 
so); Lois Shereen Winstock, Safe Havens or Dangerous Waters?  A Phenomenological 
Study of Abused Women’s Experiences in the Family Courts of Ontario 39 (Oct. 2014) 
(Dissertation, York University) (on file with York University) (describing, among other 
things, how “the [Canadian] legislative framework, and the dominant patriarchal 
discourse it promotes, inform and are reflected in judges’ responses to women’s legal 
claims in family law proceedings”).   




1. Harm to Children 
 
The damage to children subjected by family court orders to the care 
and custody of allegedly dangerous parents has yet to be fully documented, 
but some research exists.  One study of New York cases concluded that most 
custody evaluators’ recommendations were unsafe for children in homes 
where abuse was alleged, and even substantiated.25  Another study provides 
troubling and concrete evidence of what happens to children in cases that go 
awry.  Psychologist Joyanna Silberg and RN Stephanie Dallam analyzed a 
case series of “turned around” cases, i.e., those in which a first court 
disbelieved the abuse and failed to protect the child, but a second court found 
abuse and then protected the child.  They found that in the 59% of the study’s 
cases in which children had been removed from their protective mother and 
ordered into the custody of their allegedly abusive fathers, children spent an 
average of three years in the abusive parent’s custody before another court 
believed them and the decision was reversed.26 Court records showed the 
children’s deteriorating mental and physical conditions, including anxiety, 
depression, dissociation, post-traumatic stress disorder, self-harming, and 
suicidality. Thirty-three percent of these children became suicidal; some ran 
away.27  Some children survive the custody of an abusive parent only to 
commit suicide once they reach adulthood,  due to the legacy of 
 
25 MICHAEL DAVIS, CHRIS O’SULLIVAN, KIM SUSSER & MARJORY FIELDS, CUSTODY 
EVALUATIONS WHEN THERE ARE ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:  PRACTICES, 
BELIEFS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL EVALUATORS (2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234465.pdf  
26  Joyanna Silberg & Stephanie Dallam, Abusers gaining custody in family courts:  A case 
series of overturned decisions, 16 J. CHILD CUSTODY 140 (2019) (analyzing factors leading 
to custody reversals, harm suffered by children, and factors aiding in correcting the 
outcome). The study is not a statistically significant sample, because “turned-around” cases 
were referred to the researchers from a variety of sources.  Id.  However, as a “case series,”  
the study rigorously records the types and degree of injury to children when courts 
erroneously deny true abuse.  Of course, the grief and suffering this causes loving mothers 
is almost incalculable.  Vivienne Elizabeth, It’s an Invisible Wound:  The disenfranchised 
grief of post-separation mothers who lose care time, 41 J. SOC. WELFARE & FAM. L. 34 
(2019). 
27 Silberg & Dallam, supra n. 27 at Table 12. 




psychological torment they carry from their court-ordered suffering.28 Even 
apart from ongoing abuse, the trauma and psychological harm to children who 
are precipitously removed from their loving, safe parent should be obvious.29 
The suffering and trauma caused by such court orders are reported by now-
adult children and protective parents in social media.30   
 
The most drastic outcomes can be found in a compilation of children’s 
killings by a separating or divorcing parent.  The Center for Judicial 
Excellence’s growing database of over 700 filicides at the time of this writing 
identifies over 100 cases where family courts ordered – against a protective 
parents’ pleas - the parental access used to kill the child.31  
 
 
28 Rhonda Case, Louis’ Life Still Matters, FREE AS THE SUN, Mar. 18, 2019, 
https://freeasthesun.com/2019/03/louis-life-still-matters/. 
29 See Statement of APA President regarding Executive Order Rescinding Immigrant 
Family Separation Policy (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2018/06/family-separation-policy (describing 
immigrant child removals as traumatizing and causing “severe mental distress”); Silberg & 
Dallam, supra note 27 at 160 (citing attachment research); Jennifer Collins, Jennifer 
Collins Responds to Joan Meier's Article "When Abduction is Liberation," AMERICAN 
CHILDREN UNDERGROUND BLOG, http://americanchildrenunderground.blogspot.com/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2020)(after the court told the mother she should just “get over” the father’s 
extreme violence, “[w]e were ripped out of the arms of our loving mother and handed over 
to the man who was beating us!  To make it even worse we were denied all contact with 
our mother; no visits, no phone calls, not even letters.  We loved our mom so much”). In 
the G narrative above, one child became mentally ill and suicidal, others were diagnosed 
with post-traumatic stress disorder.  See n. 12, supra and accompanying text. 
30  See www.courageouskids.net, e.g., Alex’s Story, Feb. 2005, (“DCFS had indicated 4 
reports of abuse against him, yet the judge still made me go with him”); Stephanie’s Story, 
December 4, 2008 (“Evie's face was bloody, her lips swollen, and her forehead black and 
blue. He did hit us again, mostly Evie and I. He would pin our arms behind our backs and 
throw us on the floor or against walls… the judge awarded him full custody”).    
31 Child Murder Data, supra n. 2; R. Dianne Bartlow, Judicial Response to Court-Assisted 
Child Murders, 10 Fam. & Intimate Partner Violence Q. 7, 8 (2017). These stories often 
include repeated pleas for child protection by protective parents to authorities, which are 
rejected.  See, e.g., Rebecca Liebson, Officer Charged in Murder of Son, 8, Kept in 
Freezing Garage, Police Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/nyregion/michael-valva-thomas-nypd.html 
(describing autistic boy’s killing by father after forced to sleep on concrete floor in freezing 
cold garage and then bathed in cold water; mother had reported abuse for years; court and 
child welfare agency insisted on leaving children with their father).   




B. Quantitative Evidence –  
Family Court Outcomes Study Findings 
 
The domestic violence and child abuse scholarship which sounds 
the alarm about courts’ treatment of abuse allegations has had little impact 
on courts and affiliated professionals. Rather, mainstream family court 
professionals regularly dismiss abuse professionals’ critiques as 
ideological, extreme,32 or too trusting of women’s allegations.33  Such 
dismissals have been made easier by the absence of objective, neutral, 
nationwide data. 
 
Previous empirical validation of the trends represented by these 
reports has been sparse and, for practical reasons, limited to particular 
jurisdictions or courts. In 2005, four then-groundbreaking quantitative 
studies were published showing that courts in four different states 
variously lacked full information about the history of violence, failed to 
protect women and children at child exchanges, awarded as much or more 
custody or visitation to batterers than to non-batterers, and treated 




32 See Richard Warshak, When Evaluators get it Wrong:  False Positive Ids and Parental 
Alienation, 26 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 54 (2019) (describing abuse experts’  critiques 
of parental alienation, and advocacy to restrict its use in such cases, as an “extreme 
viewpoint”); Nicholas Bala, Parental alienation:  social contexts and legal responses, slide 
10 (2018) (PowerPoint made at 5th Annual Conference of AFCC) (on file with author) 
(depicting abuse critiques and aggressive PAS advocacy as two extremes, with the 
presumptively reasonable approach to alienation in the middle); Janet R. Johnston & 
Matthew J. Sullivan, Parental Alienation:  In Search of Common Ground for a More 
Differentiated Theory, 57 FAM. CT. REV. 5, n.5 (pre-publication) (2020) (citing several 
abuse experts’ scholarship as subject to “scholar advocacy bias”). 
33 Nicholas Bala, High Conflict Separations and Children Resisting Contact With a Parent, 
Slide 7 (2018) (PowerPoint) (on file with author) (“A huge limitation of the research of the 
Backbone Collective (and others) is that it is premised on assumption that the woman is 
always accurate, honest and complete in her reports!”).   
34 See generally, Joan Zorza & Leora Rosen, Guest Editors’ Introduction, 11 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 983 (2005) (contextualizing the issue and describing the studies).   




Recognizing the importance of national trend data and seeking data 
on courts’ responses to child maltreatment as well as partner violence, in 
2015 an expert team of colleagues35 and this author applied for and were 
awarded a grant from the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) to produce a 
nationwide study of child custody outcomes in cases involving abuse and 
alienation claims.36  The only way to gather national data on court outcomes 
was to examine judicial opinions posted online. Fortunately, by 2015, most 
appellate court opinions were available online, and, to our surprise, so were 
hundreds of trial court opinions.37  The Study’s search for published opinions 
covered the 10-year period from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2014.  
Two law graduates triaged over 15,000 cases which had been identified by 
our comprehensive search string, and then coded, in detail, the 4338 cases 
which fit the Study’s criteria.38   
 
A critical caveat in any discussion of the Study’s quantitative findings 
is this:  The Study could not and did not seek to analyze or second-guess 
courts’ factual determinations of the truth or credibility of abuse or alienation 
claims, or children’s best interests.   Therefore, while the data objectively 
indicate a high level of judicial skepticism toward mothers’ claims of 
domestic violence and child abuse and frequent custody reversals to allegedly 
abusive fathers, they cannot and do not demonstrate the rightness or 
wrongness of these outcomes.  Other research, however, can be brought to 
bear and is discussed in I.B.2 infra.39  
 
35 The Study team included this author as Principal Investigator; Sean Dickson, Esq, MPh, 
Chris O’Sullivan, PhD, and Leora Rosen, PhD, as social science consultants; and the Institute 
for Women’s Policy Research as quantitative analyst and managers of the archiving of the 
data.   
36 https://nij.ojp.gov/funding/awards/2014-mu-cx-0859. 
37 The dataset of 4388 e-published opinions ultimately included over 600 trial court opinions.  
Over three-quarters of these were from Connecticut and Delaware; the remaining quarter 
were primarily from New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Montana.     
38 Far more information was coded than was capable of being analyzed during the Study 
time-frame; the complete dataset is available from the NIJ Archives for secondary analyses.  
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/web/NACJD/studies/37331.   
39 Some additional limitations of the Study are described in Meier (2020), supra n. 7.  It 
should be noted that much of our data consists of simple frequencies, i.e., the percent of cases 
in which one thing or another occurred.  Frequencies speak for themselves and are not subject 
to significance testing, especially in this dataset, which is a complete census, not a sample.   




1. Skepticism Toward Mothers’40 Abuse Claims   
 
The Study netted 2189 cases in which mothers accused fathers of any 
kind of abuse (mutual abuse cases were excluded for this analysis).  
Strikingly, while courts credited (believed) mothers’ claims of intimate 
partner abuse 43% of the time, they believed mothers’ claims of child abuse 
only 21% (physical) and 19% (sexual) of the time.41  This means that courts 
have 2.8 lower odds of crediting child physical abuse (p<0.001, CI 2.1-3.8) 
and 3.1 lower odds of crediting child sexual abuse claims than domestic 
violence claims (p<0.001, CI 2.3-4.2).  On average, courts credited mothers’ 
abuse allegations only a little over 1/3 (36%) of the time.42  These data (and 
others)43 pointedly contradict the common conventional wisdom that women 
need merely to claim abuse in court to win custody of their children.44  
 
Courts’ even greater rejection of mothers’ child abuse claims 
(crediting roughly only 1/5) is particularly stunning.  The lack of attention to 
 
Where we make gender or other comparisons, we report odds ratios.  These meet statistical 
significance standards unless otherwise noted.  
40 This article focuses on mothers’ abuse claims and custody losses to shed light on the abuse 
field’s critiques of family courts. A smaller number of gender-reversed cases, i.e., where 
fathers accuse mothers of abuse and mothers crossclaim alienation, are also discussed for 
purposes of a direct gender comparison. 
41 See Statistical Analysis Appendix. 
42 Id.  
43 Teresa E. Meuer et al., Domestic Abuse: Little Impact on Child Custody and Placement, 
WIS. LAWYER (Dec. 13, 2018), 
http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/article.aspx?Volume=91&Issu
e=11&ArticleID=26737 (even criminal convictions for domestic violence did not affect 
50% of cases, which resulted in shared legal custody, including negotiated settlements). 
44 See, e.g., ALEC BALDWIN, A PROMISE TO OURSELVES 196 (2008) (quoting Harvard Law 
Professor Jeannie Suk claiming “the relative ease with which legal actors today seem able to 
view husbands as violent or potentially violent . . . [explains why] “so many child custody 
disputes [contain an] allegation of violence”); ALEXA DANKOWSKI ET AL., REAL WORLD 
DIVORCE 2017 CUSTODY, CHILD SUPPORT, AND ALIMONY IN THE 50 STATES ch. 9 (2017) 
(ebook), http://www.realworlddivorce.com/DomesticViolence (“[a]ll a woman needs to say 
is “‘I’m afraid of him.’ She gets a house, the kids, and money every month without ever 
having to give evidence, be cross-examined, or bring any additional witnesses to 
corroborate”).   




this subject in even the domestic violence literature45 is beyond the scope of 
this article but will be addressed in future scholarship. Given the substantial 
degree of overlap of both these phenomena and of courts’ responses to them, 
this article and the Study will hopefully spur future integrated research and 
analysis.46 
 
a. Outside Research on Women’s Perceived Credibility  
 
As noted above, the Study did not attempt to second-guess courts’ 
factual findings about the truth or falsity of abuse, but merely to quantify 
courts’ rulings.  Thus, a skeptic might be within her rights to argue that 
courts’ low rates of crediting of mothers’ abuse claims is not problematic, 
because women do, in fact, often falsely allege abuse.  While it is not clear 
how many unbiased skeptics47 would believe that most women’s allegations 
are false, as the courts appear to believe, a brief review of what is known 
about the credibility of women’s abuse claims is warranted.   
 
Bringing objective research to bear on this question is, of course, quite 
difficult, since it is rare that even a researcher can confidently and objectively 
assess the truth or falsity of any individual’s abuse claims.  However, what 
research exists suggests that, before parental alienation labels became de 
rigueur, even relatively conservative institutional assessors found the 
majority of women’s claims of partner abuse in court to be valid, ranging 
 
45 In contrast to the silence in the legal literature, there are a small number of relevant social 
science publications.  See, e.g., Madelyn Simring Milchman, Misogynistic cultural argument 
in parental alienation versus child sexual abuse cases, 14 J. CHILD CUSTODY 211 (2017); 
Silberg & Dallam, supra n. 27 (majority of children in the sample had been physically or 
sexually abused).   
46 See Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the ‘Child Maltreatment Revolution’?, 19 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2018) (advocating for more feminist activism to strengthen legal 
responses to child maltreatment). See also Joan Meier and Vivek Sankaran, Breaking Down 
the Silos that Harm Children:  A Call to Child Welfare, Domestic Violence and Family Court 
Professionals, (in progress)(describing tensions and contradictions between the two fields).   
47 It is not hard to find fathers’ rights advocates who assert that the vast majority of women’s 
abuse claims are false.  See, e.g., https://fathers4kids.com/issues/domestic-violence 
(“[f]athers' organizations now estimate that up to 80% of domestic violence allegations 
against men are false allegations”). Many parental alienation specialists also retain 
significant skepticism, without scientific basis.  See e.g., notes 33-34, supra.   




from 67% to 93%.48  The Study’s finding that contemporary courts only 
believe 45% of mothers’ adult domestic violence claims, is well below this 
range.   
 
More research is available regarding perceptions of mothers’ and 
children’s allegations of child abuse. A comprehensive review of the extant 
research by leading University of Michigan expert Kathleen Faller found that 
only 14% of child sexual abuse allegations in custody litigation were 
considered intentionally false, while over 50% were found valid, the 
remainder being uncertain. She also surveyed other studies which identified 
1/3 or fewer false or incorrect allegations, deeming 70% or more “likely 
valid.”49  A large Canadian study across several jurisdictions found that only 
12% of child sexual abuse allegations were deemed by the child welfare 
agency to be intentionally fabricated.  Most interestingly, custodial parents 
(mostly mothers) and children were found to be the least likely to fabricate 
(14%).  Most false claims were by noncustodial parents (mostly fathers) 
 
48 Martha Shaffer & Nicholas Bala, Wife Abuse, Child Custody and Access in Canada, 3 
LEGAL ISSUES & POL’Y IMPLICATIONS 253, 260 (2003) (judges believed 30 out of 42 (71%) 
women’s allegations of partner abuse in custody context); MATTHEW BILESKI & PHILLIP 
STEVENSON, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., ARIZ. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N 2 (2012) 
(study identified only one reported case of false reporting of spousal sexual assault over 5-
year period); Wendy Davis, Gender Bias, Fathers’ Rights, Domestic Violence and the Family 
Court, 4 BUTTERWORTHS FAM. L. J. 299, 304 (2004) (New Zealand Law Commission found 
“no empirical or qualitative evidence to substantiate allegations that ‘women were making 
strategic use of POs to prejudice fathers’ positions in custody’”… author’s own experience 
was that only 7% of contested factual hearings in PO cases resulted in court finding against 
woman’s credibility, and even in those two cases the parties agreed that the incidents had 
occurred); Johnston et al., supra note 49, at 284–85 (summarizing several other studies of 
false allegations). But cf. Johnston et al., Allegations of Abuse in Custody-Disputing 
Families, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 283, 298 (2005) (custody evaluators substantiated 41% of 
mothers’ spousal abuse allegations). 
49 Kathleen Faller, The Parental Alienation Syndrome:  What is it and What Data Support 
it?, 3 CHILD MALTREATMENT 100, 107 (1998).  See also N. Thoennes & P.G. Tjaden, The 
Extent, Nature and Validity of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation 
Disputes, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 151 (1990); Bancroft & Miller, in Bancroft, 
Silverman & Ritchie, supra n. 22 at 119-120 (surveying research on credibility of child 
sexual abuse allegations in custody litigation context and noting that even most skeptical 
researchers found over half such allegations credible).   




(43%).50 This is supported by other research finding that the primary 
fabricators of child abuse/neglect reports to child welfare agencies are 
noncustodial parents, primarily fathers.51  Nonetheless, the belief among 
court professionals that women commonly fabricate false child abuse claims 
persists.   
 
The persistence of this view is not merely the product of a history of 
societal misogyny and denial of violence against women, as is described by 
other scholars.52 Disturbingly, mistrust of women reporting abuse is 
sometimes even taught in judicial on-boarding and training, as well as 
informal “mentoring.”  Two sources from opposite coasts have independently 
reported that experienced judges regularly warn new family court judges 
against believing women’s abuse allegations.53 Former San Diego Judge 
 
50 Nico Trocmé & Nicholas Bala, False Allegations of Abuse and Neglect When Parents 
Separate, 29 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1333 (2005).  A subsequent analysis of the 2003 
Canadian Incidence Study found that agency caseworkers deemed 49% of all child abuse 
and neglect allegations to be valid, 13% suspected, and 4% intentionally false.  Nicholas MC 
Bala et al., Sexual abuse allegations and parental separation:  Smokescreen or fire?, 13 J. 
FAM. STUD. 26, 30 (2007).  Again, very few of mothers’ allegations were deemed 
intentionally false – noncustodial parents (usually fathers) were more likely fabricators.  
Child sexual abuse allegations were substantiated much less often (26%), but 54% were 
deemed made in good faith and another 15% were “suspected.” Id. Caseworkers deemed 
slightly more allegations to be intentionally false when there was simultaneous custody 
litigation, although most possibly-false allegations were made by noncustodial parents and 
third parties. Id.   
51 Heather Douglas & Emma Fell, Malicious Reports of Child Maltreatment as Coercive 
Control:  Mothers and Domestic and Family Violence, J. FAM. VIOLENCE 3, (2020), 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10896-019-00128-1 (study of batterers’ 
malicious use of false abuse reports to child welfare agencies).   
52 Id.; Deborah Epstein & Lisa Goodman, Discounting Women:  Doubting Domestic 
Violence Survivors’ Credibility and Dismissing Their Experiences, 167 U. PENN. L. REV. 
399 (2019); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Where #MeToo Came From, and Where it’s Going, 
THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 24, 2019, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/03/catharine-mackinnon-what-metoo-has-
changed/585313/. See also Bancroft, Silverman and Ritchie, supra n. 22. 
53 Maryland Working Group Minutes (Jan. 29, 2020) (judicial interviews indicated that 
“the older seasoned judges warn[ed] the incoming judges not to believe women”); Fox News 
11, Lost in the System:  Former Family Court Judge/Whistleblower Speaks Out, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 6, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MvA5hfTdsWI (same, in interview with 
former San Diego Judge DeAnn Salcido). 




DeAnn Salcido has described classes for new judges in which they were 
warned to be skeptical of the timing of child abuse allegations by women.54 
And, as is discussed in Part III, infra, ubiquitous “parental alienation” 
trainings implicitly teach courts that women’s and children’s abuse 
allegations should be received with skepticism.   
 
The studies of false abuse allegations described above relied on the 
opinions of evaluators and child welfare workers, thereby reflecting the 
opinions and potential biases of these assessors.  Such professionals are 
known for their skepticism, especially of child sexual abuse claims.55  Yet 
even these relatively conservative reviewers of abuse claims in custody 
litigation have typically viewed half to three-quarters of women’s domestic 
violence and child abuse claims as valid.  There should be little doubt, then, 
that contemporary courts’ refusals to take seriously roughly 80% of child 
abuse claims are putting a significant number of children at serious risk.  And 
as will be seen in Part III, alienation crossclaims roughly double courts’ 
skepticism, especially of child abuse claims. 
 
2. Mothers’ Custody Losses  
 
In theory, a court could reject an abuse claim without penalizing the 
alleging parent; that appears to have occurred in some Study cases. But 
custody reversals are common:  Mothers alleging a father’s abuse lost 
custody in 28% (384/1353) of all cases, ranging from a low of 23% (when 
alleging adult domestic violence) to a high of 56% (when alleging both 
physical and sexual child abuse).56 When a mother alleged any type of child 
abuse she had almost twice the odds (1.7 times, p<0.001, CI 1.4-2.2) of losing 
custody as when she alleged domestic violence.57     
 
54 Id., also stating that judges in meetings disparaged women’s claims of domestic violence 
as being “on their period.” 
55 Bancroft, Silverman & Ritchie, supra note 22, at 119 (“[w]e have found CPS investigators 
to be highly skeptical of sexual abuse allegations with concurrent custody disputes”). See 
infra Section I.B.4 (describing research documenting evaluators’ strong biases against 
believing mothers’ abuse allegations in custody litigation). 
56 “Alleged” means the abuse claim may or may not have been credited. See Statistical 
Documentation.  
57 Id.  





In striking contrast, when the genders were reversed, the outcomes 
were quite different:  Fathers reporting abuse by a mother lost custody only 
12% of the time, ranging from a low of 11% (when alleging child physical 
abuse) to a high of 33% (when alleging child sexual abuse).58   Mothers thus 
have 3.0 greater odds of losing custody than fathers when accusing the other 
parent of any abuse (p<0.001, CI 1.7-5.1); and when they allege child abuse 
(physical or sexual) their odds of losing custody are 4.2 times greater than 
fathers’ (p<0.001, CI 2.1-8.6).59 
 
Finally, the finding most confirmatory of the abuse field’s critiques is 
that even when courts believed fathers had abused the mother or child, they 
were still awarded custody 13% (64/505) of the time.  In contrast, when courts 
believed mothers had committed any type of abuse, they received custody 
only 4% (2/51) of the time.60 
   
3. Summary  
 
Three things stand out from these data:  First is the stark gender 
difference between fathers and mothers who convince the court that the other 
parent committed child physical abuse.  Fathers who courts found had 
committed some form of child abuse took custody from the mother 12% 
(10/86) of the time – none of the 25 mothers proven to be child abusers 
received custody.61  While it is surprising that any parent proven to have 
committed child maltreatment would receive custody, it is possible to 
conceive of facts that could justify this.62 However, the fact that fathers – 
 
58 There were only 6 cases where a father accused a mother of child sexual abuse; in two of 
those the father lost custody.  Id. at 22. These numbers – as opposed to those in the text - are 
far too small to be statistically significant. See Statistical Analysis Appendix. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 23.   
61 See Statistical Analysis Appendix.  
62 In some of these cases the courts had concluded either that the physical abuse was 
relatively minor, see  e.g., McMellon v. McMellon, 161 So. 3d 769, 772–74 (La. Ct. App. 
2014) (“spanking” with a belt and leaving bruises); In re C.G., No. 04–13–00749–CV, 2014 
Tex. App. LEXIS 8826, at *11 (Aug. 13, 2014) (father had discontinued spanking); or that 
the mother’s deficits were greater. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Hall, No. 258538, 2005 Mich. App. 




unlike mothers - never lost custody to a child-abusing mother provides 
interesting contrast.   
 
Second is the somewhat heartening finding that only one court gave 
custody to a parent found to have committed child sexual abuse.63  There is 
little mystery as to why most courts will not give custody to sexual child 
abusers.   
 
 Lastly, the data demonstrate that a fair number of courts are willing 
to take custody from a mother and give it to her abuser.  Thirty-five batterers 
(12%) took custody from the mothers the courts found they had abused.64  
This is troubling, given the long-established research on the psychological 
and physical risks adult partner violence poses to children, both before and 
after the adults separate.65  Extensive research indicates that the 
characteristics and behaviors of many batterers (including narcissism, 
domination and control, entitlement, etc.) are intrinsically destructive to 
children.66  Again, while idiosyncratic facts could justify these custody 
awards, the gender bias hypothesis is supported by the research and narratives 
described above, consistently describing courts and professionals who often 
 
LEXIS 956, at **8–13, n.1 (Apr. 14, 2005) (father admitted to striking daughter; mother had 
multiple arrests with possible pending incarceration for drunk driving, threatened father’s 
current spouse, and made harassing phone calls to father’s employer). 
63 In this case the father had sexually abused a third-party child and served time as a sex 
offender. Without substantiation of the allegation that he also abused the parties’ child, the 
court awarded custody to the father based her visitation interference and his superior record 
of children’s school attendance.  Mother was also found to be struggling with a concussion, 
anxiety and depression.  Higgins v. Higgins, No. A12-2127, 2014 Minn. App, Unpub. LEXIS 
60 (Jan. 27, 2014) https://casetext.com/case/higgins-v-higgins-49. 
64 Statistical Analysis Appendix.   
65 Cahn, supra note 18; Bancroft, Silverman & Ritchie, supra note 22, at 37-53, 45 (children 
suffer from exposure to battering, batterers’ modeling of misogyny, violence and disrespect, 
and batterers’ direct physical and psychological abuse, including “extraordinary 
psychological cruelty”); Einat Peled, Parenting by Men who Abuse Women:  Issues and 
Dilemmas, 30 BRIT. J. SOC. WORK 25, 28 (2000) ( “[s]eparation of their parents seems to 
increase, rather than decrease, children’s exposure to violence”).  
66 See Bancroft, Silverman & Ritchie, supra note 22, at 7-26. 




react to mothers’ claims of paternal abuse – particularly child abuse – 
dismissively, or with hostility and disgust.67   
The next section moves beyond judges to examine the role of neutral 
appointed evaluators and Guardians Ad Litem (“GAL”)68 upon whom family 
courts routinely rely.  Since these professionals’ opinions also have 
significant influence on parties’ negotiated settlements,69 data on their 
practices can also shed light on non-adjudicated cases.   
 
4. The Role of Neutral Experts 
 
For over three years, E.D. (between ages 6-10) described in detail 
multiple episodes of her father’s prior sexual abuse to her therapist, Dr. 
G, two forensic evaluators, and a subsequent therapist, Dr. L.  Dr. G, an 
expert in child sexual abuse, testified that E.D. told her that she “didn’t 
feel safe” at her father’s house, that “stuff happens . . . that involved 
touching” and “she was confused because sometimes it felt good.”70  
 
67 See supra notes 19-21, and sources cited therein; Silberg & Dallam, supra note 20; 
Bancroft, Silverman & Ritchie, supra n. 52 at 121; Winstock, supra n. 25, at 455 (describing 
one female judge’s “antipathy” to a mother’s abuse allegations). In one case, the trial court’s 
opinion contained, as written in an appellate brief, “conspicuous indications of odium,” 
including describing the mother as a “clawing” presence.  Brief for DV LEAP et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent, E.V. v. R.V., No. 10602/2007, 2017 N.Y. 
Ct. App. 2d Dept., p. 22 (March 22, 2017), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Lrgioo7JRXG2bT_TiAx3yPbHmCnEBSIc/view. 
68 While the roles of GALs may be defined differently by different states, most treat their 
role as advocating for a child’s “best interests” in the eyes of the professional. See, e.g., D.C. 
Code Sec. 21-2033. The Study coded a GAL present if there was any lawyer appointed to 
represent the child or their best interests.    
69 See, e.g., Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F. Freitas, Legal and Ethical 
Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J.L. & Fam. Stud. 43, 47, 54-55 (2011) 
(GALs’ roles and reports can increase the likelihood of settlement). 
70 E.D.’s undisputed disclosures included direct and specific verbal descriptions (e.g., when 
asked to draw something that disappointed her, drawing a time when her father was “not nice 
to her body”); expressing how she felt about her father (saying she would not be safe there 
alone); reporting physical symptoms from suppressing the abuse (keeping the secret made 
her stomach and head hurt); abnormal and unplanned behaviors such as bed-wetting and 
extremely sexual behavior with her school peers which triggered police calls; and 
dissociative states, such as screaming that her father was coming to kill her and her mother, 
even though he was not there.  More details may be found in the Amicus Brief of Georgia 




During this time she did not see her father, who was under criminal 
investigation for her abuse.  (The criminal charges were subsequently 
dropped.) 
 
Each of these adults was recognized as an expert in child sexual abuse, 
with the two forensic evaluators also qualified (variously) as experts in 
psychosexual evaluations and child psychology, and forensic 
examinations of children for sexual abuse. It was undisputed that three of 
the four found that E.D. either “was” or “may have been” sexually 
abused.  Two experts also diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”). And three recommended treatment for sexual abuse.  
They were all retained by E.D.’s mother. 
 
The court appointed as neutrals a GAL and a custody evaluator.  The 
GAL was an attorney with business law and mediation experience; the 
evaluator was a psychologist with no specialized training in assessing 
and treating cases of child sexual abuse. The GAL promptly 
recommended that contact and reunification therapy begin between the 
minor child and her father. During the reunification efforts, the minor 
child began exhibiting extreme dissociative, somatic and behavioral 
symptoms, including night terrors. 
 
Subsequently, the GAL (with the evaluator’s support) recommended that 
the father be awarded primary custody of the minor child on the basis 
that the mother was unintentionally and subconsciously “re-victimizing” 
the minor child because the mother was not allowing the minor child to 
“progress past” the issues of believed sexual abuse.  The GAL contended 
that the mother’s belief that the father had molested the minor child 
caused the minor child to singularly believe and focus upon the same.  In 
response to the significant evidence that Appellee had sexually abused 
the minor child, the guardian ad litem testified that he “refuses to address 
this issue [of whether Appellee sexually abused the minor child]” in 
conducting his investigation because it is “not in [his] job description”, 
“is a distraction from the real issue presented – i.e., the best interest of 
 
Network to End Sexual Assault et al, available on DV LEAP’s website, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pGgbECKRTK7eHSI21fyljNaSTQU5ehJ7/view.   




the [minor child]moving forward”, and he, instead, “leaves [the issue of 
whether Appellee sexually abused the minor child] with hope.” He also 
testified that he did not find the minor child’s statements to be credible 
because there were many inconsistencies and contradictions in her 
accounts of the abuse. 
The Evaluator and GAL implied that all of E.D.'s reports, emotions, 
behaviors, and symptoms (described at note 72, supra) were somehow 
derived from the supposed fact that the mother’s identity was "wrapped 
around E.D. being a victim of sexual abuse."  The custody evaluator 
posited that the mother’s influence did not allow her daughter to have her 
own independent thoughts because mother and child were "enmeshed." 
He admitted to having no child abuse, child sexual abuse or dissociation 
expertise. He further stated that even if there was a finding of sexual 
abuse, he would still recommend giving the father some custody.   
 
The court accepted the neutrals’ recommendations and, having 
temporarily reversed custody from the mother to the father, affirmed the 
temporary order and made it permanent.   
 
a. Independent research on neutral appointees 
The quality and validity of forensic evaluations in custody litigation 
has long been powerfully challenged even by mainstream family law 
scholars.  For instance, former President of the Association of Family and 
Conciliation Courts (AFCC) Robert Emery, leading scholar Elizabeth Scott 
and pioneering researcher Robert Mnookin and colleagues have asserted that 
“[p]sychologists and mental-health professionals continue to make predictive 
claims that cannot be justified by social science research.”71  Scott and Emery 
have thus called for application of traditional admissibility standards to 
exclude much of what currently passes for forensic evaluation in custody 
 
71 Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Revisited, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 251 (2014) 
(citing Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody:  The 
Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 91–95 
(2014)). See also, Scott & Emery at 94 (“many MHPs use clinical observations to make 
speculative predictions and substantiate favored diagnoses or constructs that are without 
scientific foundation”).   




cases today.72While differing from Scott’s and Emery’s critique,73 abuse 
experts have researched and documented evaluators’ problematic roles in 
abuse cases.  Perhaps the best known study, a 2011 federally-funded survey 
by University of Michigan Professor  Daniel Saunders and colleagues, found 
that many evaluators lack knowledge or expertise in domestic violence or 
child abuse, interpret abuse allegations as evidence of parental alienation, and 
ignore domestic violence as a risk factor for children.74 Other studies have 
found that evaluators failed to recommend protective measures for children 
even when abuse allegations were substantiated.75  Like judges, evaluators 
often make decisions in reaction to litigants’ demeanor:  In a study using 
hypotheticals, when a protective mother was portrayed as hostile, evaluators 
were five times more likely to recommend custody to the abuser.76  Several 
 
72 Scott & Emery, supra note 73 at 105 (arguing that application of Daubert standard would 
mean that “[e]xpert opinions about the optimal custody arrangement would be excluded, 
along with unscientific diagnoses such as PAS.  Beyond this, MHPs would be discouraged 
from offering pure credibility assessments, unsubstantiated predictions, or qualitative 
assessments on the basis of unsupported inferences”).   
73 Ironically, Scott and Emery are critical of evaluators for what they believe is evaluators’ 
acceptance of flimsy domestic violence and child abuse claims.  Id. 
74 DANIEL SAUNDERS, KATHLEEN FALLER & RICHARD TOLMAN, CHILD CUSTODY 
EVALUATORS’ BELIEFS ABOUT DOMESTIC ABUSE ALLEGATIONS:  THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
TO EVALUATOR DEMOGRAPHICS, BACKGROUND, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE KNOWLEDGE AND 
CUSTODY-VISITATION RECOMMENDATIONS (2011), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238891.pdf (finding that evaluators often did 
not recognize or understand domestic violence or saw such claims as alienation); ELLEN 
PENCE, GABRIELLE DAVIS, CHERYL BEARDSLEE & DENISE GAMACHE, BATTERED 
WOMEN’S JUSTICE PROJECT, MIND THE GAP:  ACCOUNTING FOR DOMESTIC ABUSE IN 
CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS (2012), 
https://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/mind_the_gap_accounting_for_domestic_a
buse_in_child_custody_evaluations.pdf (evaluators obscured, discounted or explained 
violence away); Silberg & Dallam, supra note 27, at 149-50 (85% of mental health 
appointees and 73% of GALs rejected abuse claims and  67% of courts cited these 
opinions); Richard Ducote, Guardians Ad Litem in Private Custody Litigation:  The Case 
for Abolition, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 106 (2002). 
75 Davis et al, supra n. 26, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234465.pdf (finding 
that most custody evaluators’ recommendations were unsafe for children, even where abuse 
was substantiated).  
76 Jennifer L. Hardesty et al., The influence of divorcing mothers' demeanor on custody 
evaluators' assessment of their domestic violence allegations, 12 J. CHILD CUSTODY 47 
(2015). 




studies have found that custody evaluators fall into two philosophical groups:  
those who understand domestic violence and abuse and believe it is important 
in the custody context, and those who lack such understanding, are skeptical 
of abuse allegations, and believe they are evidence of alienation.77  In other 
words, it appears that evaluators’ pre-existing beliefs about men, women and 
abuse, and their personalities, drive their findings and recommendations more 
than the facts of the case.78 
 
 The harmful impact of court-appointed neutrals (both evaluators and 
Guardians-Ad-Litem (“GALs”) in abuse cases was also documented in the 
Silberg and Dallam case series.79  The researchers found that the evaluators 
and GALs were generally suspicious of all abuse claims; and even when 
domestic violence was known, it was ignored. Based in large part on these 
purportedly neutral professionals’ recommendations, the children were sent 
into the care of abusive parents.80   
 
These studies have indicated serious problems with custody 
evaluators in cases involving abuse allegations. But all of the studies involved 
non-random datasets. Until now, there has been no objective quantitative 
research that could establish that these problems are systemic.  The following 
data from the Family Court Study fill this gap. 
 
 
77 Megan L. Haselschwerdt, Jennifer L. Hardesty, & Jason D. Hans, Custody evaluators’ 
beliefs about domestic violence allegations during divorce:  Feminist and family violence 
perspectives, 26 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE 1694 (2011) (evaluators’ [pre-existing ideologies 
and] level of knowledge about domestic violence had more impact on recommendations than 
facts of cases); T.K. Logan, Robert Walker, Carol E. Jordan & Leah S. Horvath, Child custody 
evaluations and domestic violence:  Case comparisons, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 719 (2002) 
(evaluators did not see domestic violence as relevant to child safety); Saunders, Faller & 
Tolman, supra note 76 (describing evaluators’ “patriarchal” beliefs). See generally, Smith & 
Coukos, supra note 23, at 39, 41. 
78 Ruth Leah Perrin, Overcoming Biased Views of Gender and Victimhood in Custody 
Evaluations when Domestic Violence is Alleged, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 155 
(2017) (describing the research).   
79 Silberg & Dallam, supra n. 27. 
80 Id. at 157-58.  “Although the role of the GAL is to protect the interests of children, the 
involvement of GALs in the cases studied often [73%] contributed to children not being 
believed or protected from abuse.”  Id. at 151.  




b. Study Findings: Neutral Appointees Increase Gender Bias in 
Outcomes 
 
The Study found that both GALs and neutral evaluators significantly 
reduced the rates at which mothers’ abuse allegations were credited.  On 
average, the presence of a Guardian Ad Litem in a case reduced such 
credibility rulings from 38% to 33%.81  This means that abuse claims are 1.3 
greater odds of being credited without a GAL than with one (p=0.016, CI 1.0-
1.5). Yet in the gender-reversed cases, the presence of a GAL had no material 
impact on the crediting of abuse when alleged by fathers against mothers 
(32% v 31%).   
 
The Study’s evaluator findings similarly indicate that the presence of 
an evaluator hurts abuse-alleging mothers’ cases.  Abuse has 1.4 greater odds 
of being credited by the court (p=0.001, CI 1.2-1.8) if there is no evaluator 
(38%) than if the court appointed an evaluator (30%).  The difference is 
particularly strong when it comes to child sexual abuse, which has twice the 
odds of being credited without an evaluator in the case (OR 2.1, p=0.036, CI 
1.0-4.1) (credited 23% without an evaluator and only 12% with).82   As with 
GALs, the impact of evaluators on mothers’ credibility stands in contrast to 
the virtually complete lack of impact of an evaluator’s presence on the 
crediting of fathers’ claims of abuse against mothers (33% v 32%).    
 
Not surprisingly, custody losses mirror these findings.83  Whereas 
without a GAL, abuse-alleging mothers’ custody losses average 25%, with a 
GAL their custody losses average 36%.  Mothers thus have 1.8 greater odds 
of losing custody when a GAL is present (p<0.001, CI 1.4-2.2); when alleging 
physical child abuse this difference increases to 3.4 (p<0.001, CI 1.8-6.4), 
and when alleging mixed physical and sexual child abuse, to 5.3 (p=0.033, 
CI 1.1-24.5).   
 
 
81 Statistical Analysis Appendix. 
82 Id. As the E.D. case narrative demonstrates, this skepticism cannot be deemed the product 
of expertise.   
83 Id.  




The same is true with evaluators:  Whereas with no evaluator 
mothers’ custody losses average 23%, with an evaluator those rates average 
42%.84  This means that mothers have 2.5 greater odds of losing custody when 
an evaluator is present than not (p<0.001, CI 1.9-3.2), increasing to 3.0 
greater odds when alleging physical child abuse (p=0.001, CI 1.5-5.8), and 
6.5 greater odds when alleging both physical and sexual child abuse 
(p=0.017, CI 1.4-30.4). 
 
The net effect is that both GALs and Evaluators profoundly 
exacerbate the gender bias in case outcomes:  Without a GAL/Evaluator, a 
mother alleging abuse loses custody 19% of the time compared to fathers’ 
11% of the time (difference not statistically significant); but with a 
GAL/Evaluator, that same mother loses custody 38% of the time compared 
to fathers’ 12%, a 4.3 greater odds of losing custody (p<0.001, CI 1.9-9.6).85  
When alleging any type of child abuse, without a GAL/Evaluator, mothers 
lose custody 23% of the time compared to fathers’ 11% (difference not 
statistically significant); with a GAL/Evaluator, mothers lose custody 43% of 
the time compared to fathers’ 10%, a 6.7 greater odds (p<0.001, CI 2.3-19.1).  
 
In contrast, the presence of a GAL or Evaluator has no statistically 
significant effect on protective fathers’ custody losses.  GALs have no 
negative impact on protective fathers’ likelihood of losing custody when 
alleging maternal abuse (13% without a GAL, and 10% with a GAL). 
Fathers’ custody losses do increase with an Evaluator (from 10% to 17%), 
but the increase is not statistically significant (likely due to the relatively few 
cases at issue). 86   
 
In summary, the Study’s findings powerfully validate the growing 
scholarly and lay critiques of both courts’ and neutral appointees’ negative 
responses to mothers’ allegations of abuse, and the gendered impact thereof.   
 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Id.  





II. THE MARGINALIZATION OF ABUSE IN FAMILY LAW AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The marginalization of abuse in family courts described above must 
be understood as partly the product of custody law and mainstream 
scholarship.   
 
A.  Custody Law Evolution 
 
Family court norms track social changes:  Over time, custody rights 
have shifted from patriarchal, to maternal, to the current gender-neutral “best 
interest of the child” standard.87  While highly discretionary, this standard is 
also constrained by two often-opposing values: (i) for joint custody or shared 
parenting and (ii) against domestic violence.  However, these priorities are 
both gendered and unequal in practice. 
 
As Professor Deborah Dinner has written, “[f]athers’ rights activism was 
instrumental in fueling a transformation in state laws from sole custody to 
joint custody.”88  Fathers’ rights advocates’ argument that they should be 
treated as equal parents after divorce was compelling, but the widespread 
adoption of the shared parenting norm was also driven by a belief that it was 
best for children. Shared parenting proponents often cite to social science 
research which has found that children parented by both of their separated 
parents after divorce retain greater resilience and achieve better academic and 
social outcomes.89 However, an important qualification to this research, that 
 
87Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting:  Custody Presumptions in 
Law and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 214 (2014). 
88 Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain:  The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family 
Inequalities, 102 U. VA. L. REV. 79, 121 (2016).  See also HERBERT JACOB, SILENT 
REVOLUTION:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 137 (1988) 
(“[j]oint custody became a cause around which men’s groups and fathers’ groups rallied”).   
89 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Post-Marital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Non-
marital Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 187 (2015) (summarizing three meta-analyses of 
over fifty studies, which found children did better academically, socially and emotionally 
when they had high-quality supportive and warm relationships with their non-residential 
fathers).   




these benefits derive from close, supportive father-child relationships, 90 is 
often forgotten.  It is rare indeed for courts to seriously consider the quality 
of the fathering relationship when ordering shared parenting, even where 
there is evidence of abuse.  Rather, father-involvement is valued per se, 
regardless of its actual effects on a child.91 Interviews with judges have 
 
Notably, earlier (pre-2000) research found quite the opposite—that non-residential 
father visitation was relatively unhelpful to children’s well-being.  See, e.g., William 
Marsiglio et al., Scholarship on Fatherhood in the 1990s and Beyond, 62 J. MARRIAGE & 
FAM. 1173, 1184 (2000) (only 42% of studies reviewed showed that post-separation father 
contact predicted any aspect of child-well-being; there was no strong support linking father 
visitation with child well-being); Valerie King & Holly E. Heard, Nonresident Father 
Visitation, Parental Conflict, and Mother’s Satisfaction:  What’s Best for Child Well-
Being?, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 385, 392 (1999) (frequent contact with fathers did not 
benefit children more than infrequent contact); Frank F. Furstenberg et al., Paternal 
Participation and Children’s Well-Being, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 695 (1987) (children who had 
not seen their fathers in five years had significantly less delinquent behavior, academic 
difficulty, distress, and behavior problems than those who saw their fathers between one 
and thirteen days over the course of the previous year).  It is possible that these studies did 
not distinguish between positive and negative father-child relationships; it is also possible 
that both these and the later father-favoring studies are influenced by changing cultural 
mores.   
90 See Huntington, supra n. 88; See also Joan B. Kelly, Children’s Living Arrangements 
Following Separation and Divorce:  Insights from Empirical and Clinical Research, 46 FAM. 
PROCESS 35, 45 (2007) (“When children have close relationships with their fathers and the 
fathers are actively involved in their lives, frequent contact is significantly linked to more 
positive adjustment and better academic achievement in school-age children, compared with 
those with less involved fathers”)(emphasis added); Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie 
DiFonzo, Closing the Gap:  Research, Policy, Practice and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. 
REV. 152, 159 (2014) (“[r]esearch has led to widespread agreement among professionals that 
children generally have improved prospects after separation and divorce when they have 
healthy, loving relationships with two parents before and after separation and 
divorce”)(emphasis added). See also Mary F. Whiteside & Betsy Jane Becker, Parental 
Factors and the Young Child’s Postdivorce Adjustment:  A Meta-Analysis with Implications 
for Parenting Arrangements, 14 J. FAM. PSYCH. 5, 16 (2000) (good father-child relationships 
benefit children).   
91 See, e.g., Musgrave v. Musgrave, No. 2D18-2792, 2019 WL 6333800, at *5, (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2019) (reversing trial court’s award of sole custody to mother due to father being 
“spiteful, vengeful and not credible,” holding that joint custody is required unless there is 
proven harm to children).  As is described in the next section, pro-shared-parenting 
scholarship similarly sidesteps the importance of the quality of the father-child 




revealed the views of some that “ordinary decent . . . domestic violence” is 
simply not relevant to custody and access.92  Rather, a recent Ontario study 
found that most of the judges interviewed believe that precedents and 
statutory law decree that shared parenting is virtually always best for 
children, and that “spousal misconduct” is essentially irrelevant, despite its 
inclusion in custody statutes because it is known to imply dangers to 
children.93   
 
Knowing the harm that abusive fathers often cause children and their 
mothers, domestic violence advocates and experts often oppose joint custody 
provisions, rightly fearing that such presumptions will outweigh attention to 
domestic violence, even where statutes contained a presumption against 
custody to batterers.94  While such resistance has occasionally prevailed,95 
the momentum toward shared parenting and maximizing fathering has been 
largely unstoppable.  Today, while 12 state statutes contain an explicit 
presumption favoring joint custody, most other statutes elevate shared 
parenting in other ways, including through “friendly parent” preferences 
given to whichever parent is more willing to share custody.96 Nor is shared 
 
relationship—perhaps because such a pre-requisite might cast doubt on the shared parenting 
project as a whole. 
92 Catherine M Naughton et al., ‘Ordinary decent domestic violence’:  A discursive analysis 
of family law judges’ interviews, 26 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 349 (2015) (describing interviews 
with six Irish judges, who idealized the nuclear family unit and normalized or trivialized 
abusive parents’ behavior, treated it as irrelevant, and pathologized mothers alleging it). See 
also Winstock, supra n. 25 (interviews with family judges indicate that most feel spousal 
abuse must be ignored in order to fulfill what they see as mandates for shared parenting and 
settlement).   
93 Id. at 458-59.  
94 See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.  Nancy Ver Steegh, Differentiating Types 
of Domestic Violence:  Implications for Child Custody, 65 LA. L. REV. 1379, 1379 (2005) 
(family courts have turned a blind eye or minimized the significance of domestic violence).   
95 In the District of Columbia, national fathers’ rights organizations led repeated efforts for 
adoption of a joint custody presumption—they were opposed each time by local domestic 
violence lawyers (including this author) but prevailed on the third round.  See Meier, supra 
note 19 at 77–80 (describing fathers’ rights’ advocates’ campaigns for joint custody and 
women’s and battered women’s advocates’ resistance). 
96 DiFonzo, supra note at 85 at 216, 218.  As of this writing, forty-two states have friendly 
parent provisions as a best interest factor. State Law Spreadsheet, supra note 7. 




parenting’s dominance dependent on explicit law; shared parenting as a value 
is universal.97   
 
At the same time, in response to efforts by battered women’s 
advocates, over half of state statutes exempt cases with proven domestic 
violence or child abuse from their shared parenting preference or 
presumption. Almost as many fail to exempt one, the other or both.98  Many 
states have also adopted exceptions to the preference for joint custody where 
there was domestic violence.99 But in the “battle of the presumptions” there 
is no contest: the shared parenting norm generally wins.100  Numerous 
scholars have described how domestic violence provisions – whether 
embodied in best interest factors, exceptions to joint custody, or presumptions 
 
97 Caselaw and unwritten preferences for shared parenting prevail in at least two states 
lacking explicit friendly parent legislation.  E-mail from Paul Griffin, Legal Director, Child 
Justice, to author (Feb. 15, 2020) (describing Maryland practice); E-mail from Kim Susser, 
Attorney, Brooklyn, New York, to author (Feb. 15, 2020) (describing judicial bias toward 
shared parenting in New York where agreed or court deems the parents able to cooperate).  
See also Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change 
in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 752 (1988) (describing court-
employed social workers “implementing the shared parenting ideal” “even without statutory 
authority”); Joan Zorza, “Friendly Parent” Provisions in Custody Determinations, 26 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 921, 923 (1992) (many judges apply an unwritten friendly parent 
analysis regardless of whether it is in the statute). 
98 State Law Spreadsheet, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1eEMq_NtSBGrwR6Ofs5mlObsQuAUIfz3y/view?usp=sha
ring.  I am deeply grateful to research assistant GW Law student Ellen Albritton for her 
conscientious and thorough research into the statutes and her compilation of and repeated 
revisions of the spreadsheet upon request.   
99 Id.   
100 Dennis P. Saccuzzo & Nancy E. Johnson, Child Custody Mediation and Domestic 
Violence, 251 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 21, 21 (2004) (in study comparing 200 child custody 
mediations involving charges of domestic violence with 200 mediations that did not, joint 
legal custody was awarded about 90% of the time, regardless of whether domestic violence 
was an issue); Allison C. Morrill et al., Child Custody and Visitation Decisions When the 
Father Has Perpetrated Violence Against the Mother, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
1076, 1092, 1101 (2005) (in study of six states’ applications of presumption against 
custody to batterers, when state also had a presumption for joint custody and a “friendly 
parent” provision the latter superseded); Meier, supra note 19, at 662 (out of thirty-eight 
appellate custody cases involving domestic violence, thirty-eight trial courts had given sole 
or joint custody to the alleged or adjudicated batterer; two-thirds were reversed on appeal).  




against custody to a batterer - are routinely superseded by the shared 
parenting ideal.101 In fact, a Wisconsin study found that even where one 
parent had been criminally convicted of domestic violence, neither settlement 
agreements nor court decisions gave much weight to the violence.102   
 
Although awareness has grown about joint custody’s down sides, 
including logistical challenges, disruption to children’s lives, and triggering 
of increased conflict and litigation,103  the joint custody ideal continues to 
powerfully shape courts’ judgments. As Fineman articulated, “opposition to 
shared custody [is seen as] pathological.  The assumption . . . is that the parent 
who rejects the shared parenting ideal and seeks sole custody of his or her 
child has an illegitimate motive.” 104  Few would disagree that in most cases 
fathers gain - while mothers lose - from a shared parenting norm, rendering 
it intrinsically gendered.  Courts nonetheless are hostile to mothers who 
 
101 Regarding the ineffectiveness of domestic violence presumptions, see Nancy K.D. 
Lemon, States Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to Batterers:  How 
Effective Are They? 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 603 (2001); Maritza Karmely, 
Presumption Law In Action: Why States Should Not Be Seduced into Adopting a Joint 
Custody Presumption, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 321, 355–58 (2016).  
Regarding the failure of domestic violence exceptions to joint custody presumptions, see 
Merle H. Weiner, Thinking Outside the Custody Box: Moving Beyond Custody Law to 
Achieve Shared Parenting and Shared Custody, 16 U. ILL. L. REV. 1535, 1568–70 (2016) 
(describing research finding that courts seem to apply joint custody to couples enduring 
significant conflict and even violence); Dana Harrington Conner, Back to the Drawing 
Board:  Barriers to Joint Decision-Making in Custody Cases Involving Intimate Partner 
Violence, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 223, 227, 247–54 (2011).   
102 Meuer et al., supra n. 40 (“[r]esearchers expected at least 75 percent of final orders to 
result in sole custody. Instead, 50 percent of cases resulted in joint custody. . . When impasse-
breaking authority is included, it increased to 53 percent . . . When the abusive parent was 
not in prison, the court orders for joint custody increased to 62 percent of cases”). However, 
primary physical placement went to the victim in 67% of cases. Id.   
103 Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law:  The Case of Child Custody, 33 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 779, 781–82 (2006).  See also DiFonzo supra note 85 at 216 (“The 
applicability, appropriateness, and even the definition of joint custody are in a state of 
fluctuation.”); Conner, supra not---, at 228 (“The vast majority of custody disputes resolved 
by trial judges are the least likely to be successful candidates for joint custody”). 
104 Fineman, supra note 95 at 765–66.  While Fineman’s words were penned in 1988 they 
could just as well have been written today; the changes she was objecting to then are now 
the norm.     




oppose “sharing.”  In short, family court culture’s emphasis on co-parenting 
creates a gendered dynamic in which mothers reporting abuse are personae 
non grata. 105 
 
B.  Mainstream Family Law Scholarship 
 
Like custody legislation and practice, the scholarly literature too has 
marginalized and minimized domestic abuse, in two respects: First, by 
extolling shared parenting, and second, by propounding misconceptions 
about family violence and family courts.  
 
1.  Shared Parenting Idealism 
 
Shared parenting is a core, if not the core topic related to parenting 
rights in the family law literature.  First, the subject is a staple of publications 
in the leading family law journal, Family Court Review, and an article of faith 
for many members of the AFCC, which publishes it.106 Reporters on a 2014 
Think Tank organized by the AFCC even concluded, among other things, that 
“violence is not as clear a presumptive factor against shared parenting as it 
might appear.”107 
 
In recent years academic scholars too have advanced shared parenting 
as the acme of enlightened custody policy.  Most recently, in Post-Marital 
Family Law: A Legal Structure for Non-marital Families,108 Clare 
Huntington argues persuasively that family law and practice must be adjusted 
to assure that co-parenting is prioritized for non-marital as well as marital 
families.  Family law, she says, must be revised to adapt to the explosion of 
“non-marital” families in which the parents separate, by giving not only 
 
105 Id.; Meier, supra note 19, at 678 (joint custody as an “absolute ideal” leads to criticism 
of mothers reporting abuse).   
106  See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzo supra n. 89 at 160, 162, 164, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/17441617/52/2 (summarizing consensus among thirty-
two family law experts that promotion of shared parenting is important for family 
wellbeing and health, is beneficial even in families with moderate or low levels of conflict). 
See also Emery et al., supra.   
107 Pruett & DiFonzo supra n. 89 at 164.  
108 Huntington, supra n. 88. 




custody-litigating parents, but unmarried and non-litigating separated parents 
automatic co-parent status.109 Huntington acknowledges that some mothers 
avoid shared parenting due to domestic violence or child abuse,110 but without 
addressing how such cases could or should be screened out, nor the likelihood 
that, at least among cases filed in court, the majority involve a history of 
abuse.111  
 
Similarly, in A Parent-Partner Status for American Family Law,112 
Merle Weiner develops a new model for how the law can and should impose 
various “duties” on any and all parents, in court or out, to create better 
“parent-partner” relationships for the benefit of children. Her appealing 
“parent-partner status” would attach certain pre- and post-separation 
obligations and duties on all parents of children in common.113  To her credit, 
Weiner’s vision starts from the practical realization that parents are often not 
up to the job of co-parenting well, and she seeks to develop a system that 
would optimize these relationships. Moreover, Weiner, herself a domestic 
violence lawyer, devotes eighteen pages of the book to discussing the 
importance of protection orders, the need to expand them to cover 
psychological abuse, and additional ways parent-partner status could improve 
relationship safety.114 She also mentions the importance of protecting 
children.115 However, the book incorporates no explicit exemptions for 
abusive relationships from the “core set of legal obligations on [all] parents 
who have a child in common that would obligate them to each other at least 
until their children are grown” (emphasis added).  This is remarkable given 
that these obligations include a duty of “relationship work.” 116  It may be a 
 
109 Id.at 225.   
110 Id. at 15, 227. 
111 See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.   
112 MERLE H. WEINER, A PARENT-PARTNER STATUS FOR AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (2015).   
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 327–45.   
115 Id. at 186.  She also criticizes Huntington for a lack of serious attention to domestic abuse.   
Id. at 122.   
116 Id.  Merle Weiner, “Parent Partnerships” Could Be the Future of Marriage, WASH. 
MONTHLY (Dec. 7, 2015), https://washingtonmonthly.com/2015/12/07/parent-partnerships-
could-be-the-future-of-marriage/ (emphasis added).  Weiner does suggest that the counseling 
requirements used to enforce the duty of “relationship work” should be sensitive to domestic 




measure of the seductiveness of the co-parenting ideal that even a domestic 
violence lawyer/scholar overlooked the inappropriateness of such a 
requirement for victims of abuse while writing a “parent-partner” book.117 
 
In defense of both Huntington and Weiner, it should be said that their 
focus is as much or more on creating “default” rules for separating families 
who never go to court, as it is on establishing rules for contested court 
cases.118  And while both scholars also suggest that their shared parenting 
rules could be enforced by courts,119 their primary focus is on parents who 
have children together but either separate or never live together.120 It might 
thus be argued that these proposals are not necessarily in tension with this 
article’s critique of court practices, if in fact, their shared parenting policies 
aim at those who never set foot in court and who have no history of abuse.121   
 
However, this seems unlikely.  Data does not exist to enumerate how 
many separating families do or do not go to court.  But there should be no 
doubt that the critique herein and in the larger domestic violence literature 
extends well beyond just those cases that are tried by a judge. Negotiated 
 
violence, WEINER, supra note 110, at 362–63. Weiner also suggests that “bad [and abusive] 
fathers” may improve once awarded “parent-partner” status.  Id. at 222–23.  The realities of 
abusive dynamics suggest otherwise.  See Andrew R. Klein & Terri Tobin, A Longitudinal 
Study of Arrested Batterers, 1995-2005, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 136, 151 (2008) 
(“Abusers’ criminal and abuse behaviors are ingrained and intertwined . . . In terms of re-
abuse, the majority of abusers re-abused, and the majority of re-abusers did so more than 
once.”).     
117 Post publication, Weiner conceded that “a better solution might be to permit domestic 
violence survivors to opt out of relationship work.” Merle Weiner, Weiner’s Response to 
Comments About the Parent-Partner Status, CONCURRING OPINIONS, (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://feedreader.com/observe/concurringopinions.com/archives%2F2015%2F11%2Fweine
rs-response-to-comments-about-the-parent-partner-
status.html%3F+itemId=3293792030?from=51873585.   
118 Huntington, supra n. 88 at 227-229 (describing “default” rules); Weiner, supra n. 110 at 
3, 31 (explaining that new legal status would automatically attach at birth of child).   
119 Huntington supra n. 88 at 229; Weiner supra n. 110 at 346, 392, 460-61 (speculating that 
few parents would “enforce” certain of the parent-partner obligations, but also articulating 
some financial obligations that could require court enforcement) 
120 Huntington supra n. 88 at 227-229; Weiner, supra n. 110 at 519 (“changes in child custody 
law would be premature . . . [first step is to] improve parents’ inter se relationships overall”).    
121 Thanks to Clare Huntington for raising this point.   




settlements, especially those negotiated after a court filing, are far from 
independent; rather they are negotiated in “the shadow of the law.”122  
Moreover, the opinions and recommendations of custody evaluators and 
other neutral professionals significantly drive settlements,123 while 
embodying the biases described above. As noted above, approximately 75% 
of filed cases have a history of domestic violence, so courts’ shared parenting 
pressure likely has significant influence on extrajudicial resolutions.124     
 
 Huntington’s proposal is fueled in part by new research led by 
Kathryn Edin into the dynamics of unmarried parents’ relationships, which 
describes many parents’ initial high hopes for family dissipating as fathers’ 
relationships with the mothers of their children become “fractious.”125  One 
wonders how many of these unmarried parents’ “fractious” relationships 
include abuse.  Indeed, another significant new study found that, in a 
population of young low-income couples:  
 
the majority of the pregnancies occurred in serious relationships  
of a relatively long duration (about 16 months), but  
those relationships were also unstable and violent. Further,  
 
122 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. (1979).  In one study, private family lawyers were among the 
professionals with the highest rates of skepticism toward mothers’ abuse allegations in 
custody cases.  Daniel Saunders, Kathleen Faller, & Richard Tolman, Beliefs and 
Recommendations Regarding Child Custody and Visitation in Cases Involving Domestic 
Violence: A Comparison of Professionals in Different Roles, 22(6) Violence Against Women 
722, 732, 737 (2016). 
123 In what is still the largest, most definitive study of how custody litigation resolves, 
Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin studied over one thousand cases in California.  They 
reported that 58% settled before getting to court, another 33% settled after mediation or 
evaluation, eleven cases (9%) went to trial, but only five cases (4%) went to adjudication.  
That is, 96% of cases settled.  ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING 
THE CHILD:  SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 150 (1994). See also Boumil et al, 
supra n. 71. 
124 See notes 49-51, supra.  DV LEAP regularly hears from mothers seeking appellate 
assistance after having agreed to an unsafe settlement under pressure from their lawyer who 
insisted (likely correctly) that joint custody was inevitable if they went to court.   
125 Huntington, supra n. 88 at 191 et seq, 196, citing KATHRYN EDIN AND MARIA 
KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP:  WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD 
BEFORE MARRIAGE 81 (2005).   




these relationships deteriorated after the pregnancy, becoming less 
serious, breaking up, and/or more violent.126   
 
Even Kathryn Edin, whose research with unmarried fathers Huntington touts, 
found that half of all the couples’ relationships ended due to domestic 
violence.127   
 
In short, the idealization of shared parenting, whether in application 
to court processes or out-of-court relationships, remains problematic until we 
can develop meaningful and reliable means of distinguishing between safe 
and unsafe relationships, and can ensure that legal rules and expectations do 
not increase harm.    
 
2.  Other Scholarly Misconceptions About Abuse in Family Court 
 
Shared parenting norms are not the only fuel marginalizing family 
violence in mainstream family law scholarship.  For instance, a high-profile 
2014 symposium publication on child custody law and practice which 
brought together leading scholars to honor esteemed pioneer of child custody 
research Robert Mnookin, contained not one discussion of the problems in 
courts’ response to family violence.  Only two of the articles even mentioned 
family violence.  The first, by Elizabeth Scott and Robert Emery, discusses 
the “gender politics” of advocacy on abuse and parental alienation.  While 
rejecting parental alienation syndrome (“PAS”) (but not the more commonly 
 
126 Jennifer Barber, Yasamin Kusunoki, Heather Gatny & Robert Melendez, The 
Relationship Context of Young Pregnancies, 35 Law & Ineq. 175 (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol35/iss2/2.  See also June Carbone and Naomi 
Cahn, Introduction, 35 Law & Ineq. 175 (2017) (Barber’s research showed that “pregnant 
women experienced relationship violence at between two and three times the rate of those 
who did not become pregnant, and the violent men were more likely than non-violent men 
to have multiple children with multiple partners”) (citations omitted).   
127 Edin & Kefalas, supra n. 122 at 81 (2005).  The researchers found that, while crime, 
substance addiction, and infidelity also played significant roles, domestic violence was the 
most common reason for breakups.  Id.  Interestingly, they found that the only population 
for whom this was not true were African-Americans, possibly because they were less likely 
to cohabit.  Id. at 98.   
 




used “parental alienation”) as unscientific, the authors also warn against 
courts’ acceptance of “marginal” abuse claims.128  They go on to state that 
“critics assert that domestic-violence evaluators are biased toward believing 
victims.”129 
 
The only other reference to family violence in this major symposium 
on child custody is in Mnookin’s own essay, which refers in passing to family 
violence in private custody litigation.  He suggests that these cases are the 
rare “easy” ones, because they involve one “clearly safe” parent and another 
known to be unsafe.130 “[More] typically,” he states, “the court must choose 
between two claimants who each offer advantages and disadvantages and 
neither of whom would endanger the child .”131   
 
These articles by esteemed scholars of family law, combined, 
articulate three common assumptions: First, that true domestic violence is 
rare (and that “insignificant” allegations are common); second, that true 
family violence cases are clear and lead courts to protect children; and third, 
that biases, if any, run in favor of victims of abuse. In fact, each of these 
beliefs is contradicted by the Family Court Outcomes Study, as well as the 
scholarship and research discussed in Part I. 
 
First, are abuse allegations rare in contested custody cases?  All 
available research suggests the opposite – abuse in the family is more 
common than not among custody-litigating families. Multiple separate 
studies have all – surprisingly - converged on the statistic that 70-75% of 
parents in “high conflict” cases which do not settle involve “marital histories 
that included physical aggression.”132  Indeed, cases involving violence and 
 
128 Scott & Emery, supra n. 73 at 86-87 (2014) (asserting that some parents bring marginal 
domestic violence claims for strategic purposes or due to distorted perceptions and feelings).  
See also supra n. 75.   
129 Id. at 97 ((citing Richard Gardner, ironically, the inventor of PAS).  The authors 
acknowledge in a footnote that a contradictory critique also exists, but don’t discuss it.  Id. 
at n.150 (citation omitted). 
130 Robert Mnookin, Child Custody Revisited, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 249, 252-53 (2014).   
131  Id.  
132 Jaffe, Crooks & Poisson, supra n. 20 at 58 (summarizing studies); BANCROFT, SILVERMAN 
& RITCHIE, supra note 22 at 120.  




abuse may be harder to settle, although there is also evidence that such 
litigants do sometimes settle cases, for a variety of reasons.133  The research 
makes clear, however, that, at least cases that go to adjudication are more 
likely to include family violence than not.  As this article suggests, this is the 
not the conventional wisdom in family court.  But it should be, given that, if 
Maccoby and Mnookin’s groundbreaking research is representative, the 
majority of separating couples settle either before or during the litigation, 
with only 4-9% ultimately going to trial.134     
 
 Second, is it true that courts are responsive to serious abuse 
allegations? If the myriad nightmare narratives shared by litigants and 
professionals, described in the literature cited above and on numerous 
websites are any indication,135 the answer is too often no.  While we cannot 
be sure of the truth of every story or report of abuse, they surely cannot all be 
written off as the fantasies and lies of deranged or vengeful mothers and their 
lawyer dupes. A cursory review of these stories and reports, and their 
numbers, should lead fair-minded readers to acknowledge that there is a 
problem in family courts’ treatment of abuse cases.  Moreover, the fact that 
the same pattern is being reported in many other countries should reinforce 
 
133 See n. 120, supra (anecdotal reports); Holly Joyce, Comment, Mediation and Domestic 
Violence: Legislative Responses, Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 
Vol. 14 No. 2 (1997); NANCY E. JOHNSON ET AL., MANDATORY CUSTODY MEDIATION: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF INCREASED RISK FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS AND THEIR 
CHILDREN, National Institute of Justice Award No. 1999-WT-VX-0015, 2, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195422.pdf (Apr. 2003).  
134 In what is still the largest, most definitive study of how custody litigation resolves, 
Eleanor Maccoby and Robert Mnookin studied over one thousand cases in California.  They 
reported that 58% settled before getting to court, another 33% settled after mediation or 
evaluation, eleven cases (9%) went to trial, but only five cases (4%) went to adjudication.  
That is, 96% of cases settled.  ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING 
THE CHILD:  SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 150 (1994). 
135 In addition to the narratives throughout this article, see literature cited in notes 19-21, 
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the conclusion.136 Finally, the data shared in Part I, infra, provides objective 
evidence that mothers reporting abuse in custody litigation, particularly child 
abuse, are ordinarily not believed and often lose custody.  Even if some of 
those allegations were untrue or were minor, there is no reason to believe that 
all were.   
 
 The third assumption, that court professionals’ biases favor women 
reporting abuse, needs no further discussion here, as it is implicitly 
challenged throughout this article. 
 
3. Scholarly Cognitive Dissonance  
 
It should be clear from the above that there is a gulf between two 
schools of family law scholars: shared parenting (or “mainstream family 
law”) 137 and abuse (or “domestic violence”) 138 scholars.  Family law scholars 
who prize co-parenting and domestic violence scholars who challenge this 
value as destructive for families experiencing abuse appear to have had little 
real dialogue, even in scholarship.139  While much of the scholarship on and 
 
136 See citations in n. 25, supra; Petition, n. 131, supra.   
137 Huntington, supra n. 88; WEINER, supra n. 110; Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic 
Fatherhood:  Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 921 (2005); 
Ariel Ayanna, From Children’s Interest to Parental Responsibility:  Degendering 
Parenthood through Custodial Obligation, 19 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 7 (2012) (arguing for 
mandatory 50-50 shared physical custody to further gender equality and force fathers’ 
involvement); Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 90 at 160, 162, 164 (summarizing consensus 
among thirty-two family law experts in 2014 that promotion of shared parenting is important 
for family wellbeing and health, even with moderate or low levels of conflict, and that 
violence is not preclusive).   
138 See sources cited supra note 19.  It should be noted that domestic violence has never been 
the only reason for scholarly opposition to shared parenting.  See, e.g., Jana Singer & William 
L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 512, 515 (1988) (opposing 
joint custody because it is an easy out for judges and prioritizes “equalization” over what 
particular children need).     
139 Jaffe, Crooks & Poisson, supra note 20 at 59 (“Historically, the domestic violence 
literature has developed in isolation of the divorce literature (and vice versa), and findings 
from one area have not informed thinking and practice in the other.”).  One exception to this 
was the exchange between domestic violence scholar Leigh Goodmark and Professor Weiner 
in a symposium discussing Weiner’s book.  See Merle Weiner, Weiner’s Response to 
Comments About the Parent-Partner Status, CONCURRING OPINIONS, (Nov. 1, 2015), 




advocacy for co-parenting gives the obligatory nod to an exception for 
domestic violence,140 as described above, such exceptions in law are 
notoriously inadequate.  Rather, preservation of the shared parenting “fairy 
tale”141 necessitates minimization and denial of abuse.   
 
Fundamentally, the shared parenting literature has yet to wrestle with 
whether co-parenting should remain a priority if, as the evidence suggests, 
abuse in the family is more common than not among separating parents.  Both 
current scholarship and law appear to be fueled more by idealism about 
shared parenting than from realism about the reasons parents part, and the 
commonality of family abuse and destructive parenting in failed 
relationships.142   
 
III. WHY? THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DENIAL  
IN  FAMILY LAW AND COURT 
 
The above discussion of family courts’ and scholars’ idealization of 
shared parenting goes a long way to explaining courts’ powerful motivation 
for not accepting mothers’ allegations of abuse by fathers. But this agenda is 
not, by itself, a sufficient explanation, particularly given that state laws 




status.html%3F+itemId=3293792030?from=51873585.  Sharing drafts of this article with 
several scholars has already triggered some thoughtful, useful exchanges.   
140 Huntington, supra note 88 at 227; Maldonado, supra note 134 at 987 (suggesting that 
domestic violence could be “highly relevant and possibly determinative” as an exception to 
a “strong presumption” of joint legal custody); Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note at 89 (domestic 
violence often—but not always—precludes shared parenting).    
141 Fineman, supra note 95 at 756, 760 (shared parenting is premised on “utopian” idea that 
“ideals of equality, sharing, and caring . . . [mean that] divorce can be painless . . . everybody 
wins”). 
142See e.g., Weiner, supra note 116 at 224 (expressing desire not to be pessimistic; preferring 
to assume that most fathers are not the “bad” kind).  Some state appeals courts are making it 
increasingly hard to justify not awarding joint custody.  Musgrave v. Musgrave, supra n. 90.  
Even where there is no legally cognizable abuse, many forms of harsh, indifferent, and poor 
parenting can also harm children and make shared parenting enormously problematic. 




deeply thoughtful.  How is it that well-intentioned scholars and judges appear 
to systematically minimize domestic abuse?  
 
 Domestic violence scholars have offered many explanations for 
courts’ rejections of likely true abuse, including lack of understanding of 
family violence and gender bias.143  These explanations have much 
validity.144  But simply inferring that too many judges are ignorant or biased 
is both questionable and unfair to the many conscientious judges doing their 
best to achieve what they believe is right for children.  It is likely there is 
something else at work, particularly when judges or other neutrals treat 
substantial evidence of abuse as though it does not exist, as in the G and E.D. 
cases narrated above.  Social media and professional reports abound in which 
clear evidence of almost certain abuse is ignored, minimized and sidestepped, 
or its existence denied.145 Such obviously erroneous conclusions may be best 
understood as a form of psychological denial. 
 
A.  The Phenomena of Individual and Social Denial  
 
Discussions of abuse are inherently resisted by many people in many 
settings.  Many in the domestic violence field are careful to only share horrific 
stories when given permission, because they can be so disturbing. It turns out 
that human brains are hard-wired with defenses against awareness of horrific 
realities, especially those inflicted by humans against others.  Social science 
 
143 Epstein & Goodman eloquently describe courts’ “discounting” of survivors’ credibility 
as a function of lack of understanding of domestic violence and trauma, and implicit gender 
stereotypes.  Epstein & Goodman, supra note 53.   
144 Even decisionmakers who are not sexist but who are wedded to the shared parenting ideal 
may bend over backwards to excuse fathers’ poor behaviors while condemning mothers.’ 
Since mothers are thought to have an automatic advantage in custody litigation, and are often 
children’s primary caretakers, both advocacy for and implementation of “shared parenting” 
manifests as a mandate for paternal involvement, leading to an implicit bias toward fathers.  
Fineman, supra note 95.   
145 See narratives at pp. 8-9 & 25-27; note 132, supra.  See also Whitney Reynolds, A Mother 
Fights for Her Daughter’s Injustice, Stop Abuse Campaign – Custody Court Crisis Blog, 
https://stopabusecampaign.org/2019/07/26/a-mother-fights-for-her-daughters-injustice/  
(July 26, 2019)([a]fter three hospital reports and police reports  “verifying my daughter’s 
sexual abuse and trauma, the G.A.L. filed new motions to give the father unsupervised visits 
with my daughter including overnights. . . . For eight years, I was relegated to supervised 
visits of two hours a week”). 




has documented societal psychological denial in relation to war, terrorism, 
state violence and atrocities, as well as violence against women and children. 
Yet the psychology of unconscious denial has not heretofore been discussed 
in connection with society’s and courts’ resistance to “really knowing” about 
family abuse.146 
 
In his foundational work of sociology, STATES OF DENIAL:  
KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING, Stanley Cohen 
draws on early psychoanalytic theory to explain why and how individuals and 
society avoid knowing about or acting in response to humanly inflicted 
horrors such as terrorism, war, and genocide.  He describes “the foundation 
of human denial” as follows: 
 
Denial is understood as an unconscious defense mechanism  
for coping with guilt, anxiety, and other disturbing emotions  
aroused by reality.  The psyche blocks off information that  
is literally unthinkable or unbearable.  The unconscious  
sets up a barrier which prevents the thought from reaching  
conscious knowledge.147  
 
This form of denial is not the intentional denial of facts consciously 
known to the denier, a phenomenon that is all too common in today’s world.  
Rather, it reflects primarily a subtle, mostly unconscious psychological 
process.  Whereas some of us may consciously choose not to listen to news 
about “starving children in Iraq [or] genocide in Rwanda,”148 because the 
constant awareness of such excruciating human suffering is too hard to carry, 
in other settings unconscious denial “serves to numb, enables avoidance of 
the unthinkable or protects the psyche by blocking out awareness of cruelty 
 
146 If you are finding reading this article unpleasant, or wanting to put it down, your own 
defenses may be at work.   
 
147 Mark S. Hamm, 11 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 177, 178 (2002) (reviewing and quoting 
STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 
(2001)).   
148 Id.   




and extreme horrors committed by some towards others . . .”149  Of course, 
judges and evaluators are not entirely free to choose not to listen to horrific 
(e.g., child sexual) abuse reports; however, as seen in the cases described 
above, they may find other ways to minimize and deny such traumatic facts.   
 
 Denial operates both on an individual and a social level.  This  
 
refers to the maintenance of social worlds in which an undesirable 
situation . . . is unrecognized, ignored or made to seem normal . . . 
Domestic violence went through a familiar sequence from denial to 
acknowledgement. . . the phenomenon was hidden from public gaze; 
normalized, contained and covered up.150  
  
Cohen also emphasizes another, more complex form of denial: “[T]here seem 
to be states of mind in which we know and don’t know at the same time.”151  
Countries which neighbored Nazi Germany knew but needed to “not know” 
about the horrors being perpetrated by their neighbor.152  Neighbors of a 
woman with a black eye may “know” but “not know” what caused it.  Or 
countries such as Canada may “forget” that their colonization of the 
indigenous inhabitants caused untold suffering, which is arguably ongoing.153  
Such denial is society-wide (although there is often a minority who fight the 
denial), and is perpetuated by social mechanisms which protect a dominant 
perpetrator from shame, via popular culture, language, and state actions.154  
 
149 Genevieve Parent, Genocide Denial:  Perpetuating Victimization and the Cycle of 
Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 10 GENOCIDE STUD. AND PREVENTION: AN INT’L J. 38, 
42 (2016). 
150 Cohen, supra at 51. 
151 Hamm, supra note 144, at 178.   
152 Id.   
153 Rebecca Bychutsky, Social Denial:  An Analysis of Missing and Murdered Indigenous 
Women and Girls in Canada (2017) (M.A. thesis, University of Ottawa) (on file with 
University of Ottawa) (“denial is best conceptualized as a social practice . . . social denial 
refers to patterned behavior where actors both know and do not know about uncomfortable 
truths”) (citing Cohen) 
154 Hamm, supra note 144 at 178; Bychutsky, supra note 149, at 116 (stating that even the 
Canadian government “inquiry” into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls 
(“MMIWG”) is an exercise in denial because it treats MMIWG as “a new phenomenon 
instead of one entrenched in a colonial history of violence”).   




Denial is more likely when the perpetrators are individuals or groups with 
whom we identify, or have reason to want to trust.155  It seems likely that the 
G court and E.D. GAL were operating from such a partial awareness 
combined with a goal-oriented, assertive “not-knowing.”156 
      
B.  Denial of Violence Against Women and Children 
 
In her 1992 masterwork TRAUMA AND RECOVERY,157 Harvard 
psychiatrist Judith Herman amplified on society’s “episodic amnesia” about 
humanly inflicted trauma and its impact on survivors, particularly women.158  
Starting with the “hysteria” diagnosis given to troubled women in the late 
1800s, she points out the similarities between that condition and the 
“shellshock” or “combat neurosis” which severely afflicted many ex-soldiers 
after the world wars.  In both cases, society’s initial response involved moral 
denigration of the sufferers, who were cast as malingerers.  Unlike women’s 
“hysteria,” however, social views of war trauma haltingly gave way to a more 
objective, medical understanding of the ways war experiences could render 
anyone psychically troubled.159   
 
Herman likens the impact of violence against women to war trauma, 
calling it the “combat neurosis of the sex war.”160 Noting that prior to the 
women’s movement in the 1970s, speaking “about experiences in sexual or 
domestic life [invited] public humiliation, ridicule and disbelief,” she 
describes how “consciousness-raising” groups helped women begin to 
 
155 STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL:  KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING 163 
(2001) (“the atrocities of official enemies arouse great anguish and indignation . . . the 
treatment is opposite in all respects when responsibility lies closer to home”). 
156 Similarly, a Maryland judge found that a mother was full of “unfounded accusations” 
despite the fact that she had been awarded a protection order against her husband (who was 
represented by counsel) after proving her allegations by “clear and convincing” evidence. 
The judge focused instead on the fact that criminal charges for child abuse were dropped. G 
v. C, Bench Opinion (2010) (on file with author). The husband even admitted that he had 
surveilled the petitioner with three separate GPS trackers on her car, and that he controlled 
every move she made.  Id.  
157 Herman, supra note 9 at 10-20. 
158 Id. at 7 et seq. 
159 Id. at 19, 24-25.   
160 Id. at 28, 32.  




acknowledge the truth of their own painful lived experiences.  Over time, 
recognition of rape trauma led to deeper investigations of previously hidden 
domestic abuse of all kinds, including child sexual abuse.161   
 
However, these women’s new awareness of the reality and 
commonality of abuse - particularly child abuse - was never fully integrated 
into broader social awareness.  Indeed, abandoning social denial of atrocities 
is far harder than not:   
 
It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator. All the  
perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing. He appeals  
to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The victim,  
on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain.  
The victim demands action, engagement, and remembering.162 
 
While many, especially in courts, may accept the fact that family abuse 
exists, the palpable description of traumatic events, especially child abuse, 
fundamentally threatens our unconscious need to not know, and to see family 
as a warm, safe haven in which to grow and love. For this reason, Herman 
argues that conscious acceptance of “traumatic reality . . . requires a social 
context that joins victim and witness in a common alliance.”  Such a social 
context can only emerge, she says, from “political movements that give voice 
to the disempowered and are strong enough to “counteract the ordinary social 
processes of silencing and denial.”163 
 
Such a movement began with the women’s movement and its 
descendant, the “battered women’s movement.”164 They ushered in powerful 
change in social awareness and remedies for the newly recognized, 
widespread phenomenon of domestic violence.  Their “consciousness-
 
161 Id. at 30-32.  
 
162 Id. at 7-8.   
163 Id. at 9.   
164 Id. at 28-31; Kristian Miccio, A House Divided:  Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, 
and the Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 248-
49 (2005). 




raising” engendered substantial law reforms between the 1970s and 1990s, 
providing state-level civil and criminal remedies for domestic violence and 
ultimately federal recognition through the 1994 Violence Against Women 
Act.165  As is clear from the extensive critical literature, however, these 
significant changes have never fully penetrated the family courts, where the 
dominant norm is support for fathering.166  
 
Even more problematically, the increased social recognition of domestic 
violence has never extended to familial child abuse.  No movement for 
children comparable to the women’s movement has ever emerged.167  Indeed, 
despite early feminist activists’ explicit linkage of child sexual abuse to 
domestic violence and rape activism,168 child sexual abuse today continues to 
be erroneously considered by many a crime committed by strangers who 
kidnap and molest strange children.169 And much physical and emotional 
child abuse continues to be conflated with “discipline” and/or mere 
strictness,170  or minimized with reference to children’s “resilience.”  In short, 
familial child abuse continues to be subject to a variety of forms of social 
misconceptions, minimization and denial. 
 
165 See generally Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State:  The Struggle for the Future 
of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 1657, 1658-75 (describing evolution of 
new legal responses).     
166 Meier, supra n. 19; see also citations in n. 19, supra. 
167 Claire Houston, What Ever Happened To The "Child Maltreatment Revolution?”, 19 
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 28 (2017).   
168 Herman supra note 9, at 30-31; Houston, supra note 163, at 28 (2017) (early feminists 
asserted that child sexual abuse was “an expression and tool of male domination. . . This 
power, like men’s power over women, was rooted in the patriarchal family”). 
169 See Bernard Gallagher, Michael Bradford & Ken Pease, The Sexual Abuse of Children by 
Strangers: Its Extent, Nature and Victims’ Characteristics, 16 CHILDREN & SOCIETY 346, 
347 (2002). 
170 ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY:  THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 9 (1987) (“the right of 
discipline has served as a justification for virtually all forms of assault by parents and 
husbands short of those that cause permanent injury); Stephanie A. Whitus Walsh, The 
Relationship of Victims’ Perceptions of Child Physical Abuse and Adult-Formed Attitudes 
Toward Physical Forms of Discipline and Perpetrators of Child Physical Abuse (2006) 
(Ph.D. thesis, Sam Houston State University) (on file with author) (behavior viewed by child 
victims and perpetrators as “as normal punishing techniques” may meet legal standards of 
abusive treatment).   




This denial persists despite several established truths:  First, it is no 
longer disputable that 90+% of sexually abused children know their abusers, 
and the majority of all child sexual abuse is committed by a parent or other 
family member.171 Second, the longitudinal, massive, federally-supported 
Adverse Childhood Experiences (“ACEs”) study has underlined the lifelong 
and societally costly psychic and physical harms from living in a home with 
abuse of oneself, one’s parent or both.172  And last, decades of research have 
established that intimate partner violence and child abuse often go hand in 
hand, frequently  fueled by the same patriarchal values of male dominance 
and female subordination.173  None of these fairly uncontroversial 
understandings within the abuse field appear to have penetrated court 
practices; in fact, professional training and much research literature continue 
to not only minimize abuse but also to treat child abuse and domestic violence 
as utterly distinct.174 
 
 
171 See, e.g., Lisa Cromer & Rachel Goldsmith, Child Sexual Abuse Myths:  Attitudes, Beliefs, 
and Individual Differences, 19 J. Child Sex. Abuse 618, 631 (2010); Darkness to Light, 
http://www.d2l.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Statistics_2_Perpetrators.pdf; RAINN, 
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/children-and-teens (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (80% of child 
sexual abuse is committed by a parent) (citing UNITED STATES DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES, ADMIN. ON CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES, CHILD MALTREATMENT SURVEY, 
2016 (2018)). Both policymakers and media often mislead the public by treating child sexual 
assault as purely a problem of stranger-danger.  
172 Vincent J Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to 
Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults:  The Adverse Childhood Experiences 
(ACEs) Study, 14 AM. J. PREV. MED. 245, 251 ([t]he findings suggest that the impact of these 
adverse childhood experiences on adult health status is strong and cumulative”).    
173 Jeffrey L. Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman Battering, 5 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 134 (1999); Bancroft & Miller, supra note 25, at 108, 110 
(“exposure to batterers is among the strongest indicators of risk of incest victimization . . . 
the sexually abusing batterer appears to stand out for his high entitlement, self-centered 
expectation that children should meet his needs (role reversal), high level of 
manipulativeness, and perception of his children as owned objects”).  
174See Desiree Kennedy, From Collaboration To Consolidation:  Developing A More 
Expansive Model For Responding to Family Violence, 20 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 1, 8 
(2013) (domestic violence and child maltreatment systems have had largely separate and 
distinct histories, philosophies, and approaches); Meier and Sankaran, Breaking Down the 
Silos, supra n. 47.   




It appears that recognition of child abuse remains society’s Rubicon 
– it remains to be crossed.  Significant conscious psychological work is 
required in order to “bear witness” to such atrocities.175  Society’s and 
individuals’ denial is perhaps not entirely surprising, despite the significant 
progress society has made on adult gender and violence issues. “Repression, 
dissociation and denial are phenomena of social as well as individual 
consciousness.”176 This is particularly evident in court. 
 
While the persistence of denial and the limits of social progress 
regarding family abuse are significant, there is some reason for cautious 
optimism.  Over the past four years, a new movement for gender justice has 
erupted:  The #MeToo movement has triggered a plate tectonic shift in social 
and professional responses to women’s claims of sexual abuse on the job.  
“Reporting of sexual abuse is starting to be welcomed rather than punished, 
on the view that accountability, not impunity, should prevail for individuals 
and institutions that engage in or enable such abuse.”177  Where once there 
was denial, suppression and ridicule, there is now concern, support, and 
credibility. Previously routine denials and dismissals of women’s reports of 
sexual harassment are beginning to be replaced with concern and efforts 
toward accountability; and sexual abuse is finally beginning to be recognized 
and described “by the established media as pervasive and endemic rather than 
sensational and exceptional.”178  The #MeToo movement arguably meets 
Herman’s pre-requisite of a “political movement” for the lifting of the veil of 
denial. 
 
That is the good news.  However, as has been pointed out by domestic 
violence experts Epstein and Goodman,179 #MeToo has not yet filtered into 
courts responding to domestic violence. One reason is that a key ingredient 
for many of #MeToo’s successes, the existence of multiple women’s reports 
 
175 Herman, supra note 9.   
176 Id. 
177MacKinnon, supra n. 53 (“#MeToo, Time’s Up, and similar mobilizations around the 
world—including #NiUnaMenos in Argentina, #BalanceTonPorc in France, 
#TheFirstTimeIGotHarassed in Egypt, #WithYou in Japan, and #PremeiroAssedio in Brazil 
among them—are shifting gender hierarchy’s tectonic plates”). 
178 Id.     
179 Epstein & Goodman, supra note 50.   




of one perpetrator’s abuses,180 is not available in the court context, where a 
single victim (or mother-child duo) typically accuses a single perpetrator.  
And because all cases are adjudicated individually and involve unique facts, 
it is harder to establish systemic patterns across different courts and cases. 
The Child Custody Outcomes Study, however, provides the first such pattern 
analysis, which is essential to chipping away at social denial.181  
 
In the meantime, until “#MeTooinFamilyCourt” gains traction, the 
pull of psychological denial and the push for shared parenting help explain 
why courts have been so receptive to the notion of “parental alienation,” 
which offers a convenient scientific-sounding reason to reject mothers’ and 
children’s abuse allegations.   
 
IV.  HOW? THE MACHINERY OF DENIAL IN FAMILY 
COURT  
 
Parental alienation theory was originally termed “parental alienation 
syndrome” or “PAS.” Richard Gardner, PAS’ inventor, framed mothers’ 
allegations of child sexual abuse against fathers in custody battles as typically 
 
180 MacKinnon observes that campus sexual assault cases are likely to be successful only 
when there are a minimum of four accusers, rendering a woman one-quarter of a person for 
purposes of credibility. MacKinnon, supra n. 53.  See, e.g., Carla Correa, The #MeToo 
Moment:  For U.S. Gymnasts, Why Did Justice Take So Long?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/us/the-metoo-moment-for-us-gymnasts-olympics-
nassar-justice.html (discussing how Olympic gymnastics doctor Larry Nassar was given a 
life sentence after over 100 women reported his abuses); Anna North, Bill Cosby is in 
prison. But the first real #MeToo trial hasn’t happened yet., VOX, Oct. 1, 2018, 
https://www.vox.com/2018/10/1/17902810/bill-cosby-sentencing-harvey-weinstein-larry-
nassar (describing how Bill Cosby was convicted after numerous women had spoken out;  
Harvey Weinstein and Larry Nassar were also accused by numerous women). 
181 In an analysis of the parallels between the #MeToo movement and Transitional Justice 
movements in societies recovering from political terror, several scholars note that social 
denial of systemically perpetrated and socially condoned atrocities creates a need to 
“counter[] denial by directly uncovering and properly characterizing the wrongdoing which 
took place, as not simply the ordinary misconduct of a few isolated actors in ways that were 
exceptional, but rather as part of a pattern of behavior that became unexceptional, that 
targeted groups, and that was committed by groups” [emphasis added].  Lesley Wexler, 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Colleen Murphy, #MeToo, TimesUp, and Theories of Justice, 2019 
U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 101 (2019). 




pathological, vindictive, and false.182  And while contemporary proponents 
of parental alienation theory distinguish it theoretically from PAS, these 
nuances in the literature rarely appear in court practice. Thus, the Child 
Custody Outcomes study confirms quantitatively that “parental alienation” is 
a powerful weapon against mothers alleging abuse, and a virtual trump card 
against child sexual abuse allegations. This is so despite the absence of any 
scientific validation of alienation theory’s assumptions and assertions, and 
the existence of some credible scientific research refuting them. Alienation 
theory’s ubiquity in family courts is best understood as a function of its 
usefulness in furthering the goal of maximizing father involvement, by 
providing a pseudo-scientific basis for rejecting mothers’ and children’s 
claims of abuse.183   
 
* * * * 
"I don't want to be around my daddy when he's mad."    
"Frankly, this child is afraid of Mr. H.” (custody evaluator).  
There was little doubt why the boys were afraid of their father.  He 
had slapped and choked their mother in front of them, viciously 
sexually assaulted her while they were upstairs, hit his sons, and 
extensively humiliated his four-year-old autistic son in front of guests 
at a Christmas party because the boy had wet his pants.  Yet the trial 
court concluded that the boys were afraid of him because of their 
mother’s conduct, not his.184 
 
Based in part on a conversation the judge had had with an expert in 
parental alienation at a conference, the judge accused the mother of 
 
182 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.   
183 Alienation proponents often contend that PA is not only about mothers’ abuse claims, is 
often alleged against fathers, and is an issue in many non-abuse cases, assertions which the 
Study has actually confirmed.  Child Custody Outcomes, supra note 7 at 18 (noting that 
outcomes in alienation cases without abuse claims appear more gender-neutral).  However, 
this does not negate the concept’s original purpose and current effectiveness in denying 
mothers’ and children’s credible abuse claims.  
184 In re Marriage of Crystal and Shawn H., D061388, 2013 WL 2940952, (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 17, 2013).  The appeal was filed with the assistance of an amicus brief from DV LEAP, 
co-authored by this author.  See Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Justice for Children et al., 
In re Marriage of Crystal and Shawn H., 2013 WL 2940952 (No. D061388).  




creating a "revisionist history" about the father’s conduct with the 
children, found that any harm suffered by the boys was merely 
"collateral damage" from the wife-abuse, and concluded that their 
fear of their father was the product of her “conscious” or 
“unconscious” statements to the children.   Accordingly, the court 
ruled that as soon as the father was released from prison (where he 
was serving six years for his felony sexual assault of the mother), he 
should have access to his children, without regard to either their 
feelings or his attitude.185  
 
In this case, the mere extra-legal suggestion of “alienation” was 
enough to wipe away the extensive and undisputed abuse – including the 
father’s felonious sexual assault of the mother with the children in the house, 
verbal and physical abusiveness toward the children and the children’s 
understandable fear.  Instead of triggering a protective response, the 
alienation label invited the judge to shift responsibility for the relationship 
breach from the father to the mother, and to order child access for the father 
as soon as possible.186 
 
In another case from another state, the oldest child reported his 
father’s hitting, pinching, being mean and being drunk; he had also 
witnessed his father strangling his mother, and he told evaluators that 
he feared his father would kill him.  Rather than inferring the obvious, 
the evaluator characterized this child’s feelings as “unnatural . . . 
abnormal” - and thereby evidence of alienation. The court adopted 
the parental alienation label and ordered custody to the father. 187 
A. History of Parental Alienation Theory 
 
 
185 The order was reversed on appeal, in a forthrightly critical opinion.  See In re Marriage 
of Crystal and Shawn H., 2013 WL 2940952.   
186 See Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of Justice for Children et al., supra note 147, at 25–
27.  
187 Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of the Arkansas Coalition Against Domestic Violence et 
al at 15–16, Oates v. Oates, 2010 Ark. App. 346, at 6, 2010 WL 1609411 (No. CA09-498). 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1kkENJxL78w0xDNj28eeipcNMhmTduryv/view.  




There is a kernel of common sense at the core of the theory of parental 
alienation:  Separating or divorcing parents do sometimes encourage their 
children to choose sides against their ex-partner. (This surely happens in 
intact families too.)  Indeed, batterers are notorious for demeaning and 
undermining the other parent and her parenting authority or relationship with 
the children.188  However, not until psychiatrist Richard Gardner invented the 
“Parental Alienation Syndrome” (“PAS”) to combat mothers’ efforts to 
protect children from dangerous fathers in custody litigation, did family court 
professionals start treating parents’ denigration of each other in the custody 
context as a serious concern.189    
 
Gardner asserted that vengeful ex-wives employ child abuse 
allegations as a ‘‘powerful weapon’’ to punish the ex and ensure custody to 
themselves, that they often ‘‘brainwash’’ or ‘‘program’’ the children into 
believing untrue things about the father, and that the children then fabricate 
their own added stories.190  Without sources, he asserted that the majority of 
child sexual abuse claims in custody litigation are false,191 although he 
explained some mothers’ “vendettas” as the product of pathology rather than 
intentional malice.192  Gardner strongly implied that when children reject 
their father and the mother alleges child abuse in custody litigation, these 
behaviors are likely part of the PAS rather than actual experiences of abuse.193 
 
 
188 See Understanding the Power and Control Wheel, DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION 
PROGRAMS, https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wheels/understanding-power-control-
wheel/#children (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (includes “using children” as one of several 
non-violent battering tactics); LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS 
PARENT (2002). 
189 See Joan Meier, A Historical Perspective on Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental 
Alienation, 6 J. CHILD CUSTODY 232, 235 (2009). 
190 RICHARD A. GARDNER, TRUE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 160-
161, 193, 199-200 (1992) (hereinafter GARDNER, TRUE AND FALSE); Richard A. 
Gardner, Parental Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental Alienation:  Which Diagnosis Should 
Evaluators Use in Child Custody Disputes? 30 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 93, 94 (2002) 
(hereinafter GARDNER, WHICH DIAGNOSIS). 
191 RICHARD A. GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA:  SALEM WITCH TRIALS REVISITED 3-4 
(1991) (hereinafter Gardner, SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA). 
192 Id. at 25-42. 
193 Gardner, TRUE AND FALSE at 159-161.   




Gardner’s PA “syndrome” presented an easy target for critics:  He 
used conclusory analysis (e.g., he cited the “presence of PAS” as an 
indication that child abuse claims are false, while also stating that if child 
abuse is true it’s not PAS), he invoked fabricated (and empirically 
contradicted) statistics, his “diagnostic” criteria were conclusory and 
flagrantly subjective, and he had published bizarre beliefs about human 
sexuality, including a defense of pedophilia.194  Since there was no scientific 
proof of the purported “syndrome” and since Gardner’s explanations - such 
as his suggestion that mothers falsely allege child sexual abuse because they 
are titillated by the thought of their husbands having sex with their children195 
- were outrageous, PAS has been widely discredited as lacking scientific 
credibility,196 and ruled inadmissible by several courts.197 Eventually it was 
definitively rejected (after extensive contention) in 2012 by the Fifth 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-V) of psychiatric disorders.198 
 
However, “alienation” writ large has remained, thanks to the work of 
a number of family court professionals and researchers who developed a 
‘‘reformulation” of PAS, termed ‘‘parental alienation’’ or ‘‘the alienated 
 
194 Jennifer Hoult, The Evidentiary Admissibility of Parental Alienation Syndrome:  Science, 
Law and Policy, 26 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 9–11, 13–15, 19–21 (2006); Carol S. Bruch, 
Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation:  Getting It Wrong in Child Custody 
Cases, 35 Fam. L.Q. 527, 530–36 (2001). 
195 GARDNER, SEX ABUSE HYSTERIA 25-26, 31; RICHARD A. GARDNER, THE PARENTAL 
ALIENATION SYNDROME:  A GUIDE FOR MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 
(1992) (hereinafter GARDNER, GUIDE). 
196 Meier, supra note 185, at 238–39. 
197 See People v. Fortin, 289 A.D.2d 590, 591 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); M.A. v. A.I., A-4021-
11T1, 2014 WL 7010813, at *5 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 15, 2014), certification 
denied, 112 A.3d 592 (2015) (unpublished); D.M.S. v. I.D.S., 2014-0364 (La. App. 4 Cir., 
3/4/2015) (unpublished); People v. Sullivan, Nos. H023715, H025386, 2003 WL 1785921, 
at **13–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2003) (unpublished); Mastrangelo v. Mastrangelo, 55 
Conn. L. Rptr. 245, 2012 WL 6901161, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012) (unpublished); Snyder 
v. Cedar, No. NNHCV010454296, 2006 WL 539130, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2006) 
(unpublished). 
198 See Holly Smith, Parental Alienation Syndrome:  Fact or Fiction—The Problem with Its 
Use in Child Custody Cases, 11 U. MASS L. REV. 64, 76 (2016). 




child.’’199 Janet Johnston, an early leader of this research, defined an 
alienated child as one  
 
who expresses, freely and persistently, unreasonable  
negative feelings and beliefs (such as anger, hatred, rejection  
and/or fear) toward a parent that are significantly disproportionate  
to the child’s actual experience with that parent.   
Entrenched alienated children are marked by unambivalent,  
strident rejection of the parent with no apparent guilt or conflict.200  
This definition, depending on the subjective conclusion that a child’s feelings 
are “unreasonable,” encourages the assumption that such negative feelings 
toward a parent may derive from an illegitimate source. The obvious fact that 
custody-contesting parents are adversarial fuels the conclusion that children’s 
hostility is likely an extension and product of that adversarialism.  
Parental alienation has by now become a ubiquitous label in cases 
where a post-separation parent or child is resistant to regular unsupervised 
contact between the other parent and the child.  The scholarly literature on it 
has exploded.201 And unlike PAS, “parental alienation” has yet to be ruled 
inadmissible or authoritatively rejected as junk science, perhaps in part 
because without use of the word “syndrome,” it appears more factual than 
scientific, leading courts and professionals to treat it as more or less a matter 
of common sense. 
 
199 Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, The Alienated Child:  A Reformulation of Parental 
Alienation Syndrome, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 249, 251 (2004).  
200 Janet R. Johnston, Children of Divorce Who Reject a Parent and Refuse Visitation:  
Recent Research and Social Policy Implications for the Alienated Child, 38 FAM. L.Q.  
757, 762 (2005).  This definition’s emphasis on “stridency” and “no apparent guilt or  
conflict” echoes Gardner’s descriptions of PAS.  GARDNER, WHICH DIAGNOSIS, supra  
note 152, at 97 (listing “lack of ambivalence” and “absence of guilt” as two symptoms of  
PAS). 
201 The literature is far too vast to summarize here. But alienation’s ubiquity is indicated by 
the fact that the Family Court Review has done not one but two special issues on the subject, 
ten years apart.  (Special Issue) Parent-Child Contact Problems:  Concepts, Controversies 
and Conundrums, 58:2 Family Court Review 259 (April 2020); Special Issue on Alienated 
Children in Divorce and Separation:  Emerging Approaches for Families and Courts 48:1 
Family Court Review 1 (2010 




Over time, scholarship has added nuance to discussions of alienation. 
Some leading alienation scholars now acknowledge that (i) children may 
resist time with a parent for many understandable reasons, such as the child’s 
own vulnerabilities, separation anxiety, reaction to the parents’ separation, 
and other developmental circumstances; and that (ii) the avoided parent’s 
behaviors are often part of the problem.202  New terminology, such as 
“visitation refusal/resistance”203 is sometimes used to indicate greater 
neutrality as to cause; though other new terms, such as “gatekeeping,” 
continue to hold the custodial parent responsible for undermining the other 
parent’s relationship with a child.204  Nonetheless, while some scholarly 
alienation experts take pains to distance themselves from PAS and its singular 
focus on a toxic preferred parent,205 other alienation proponents continue to 
assert that PAS and PA are essentially the same. 206  
 
202 See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston & Joan B. Kelly, Commentary on Walker, Brantley, and  
Rigsbee’s (2004) “A Critical Analysis of Parental Alienation Syndrome and Its  
Admissibility in the Family Court,” 1 J. CHILD CUSTODY 77, 79 (2004); Sheley Polak &  
Michael Saini, Children Resisting Contact with a Parent Post-Separation:  Assessing this  
Phenomenon Using an Ecological Systems Framework, 56 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE  
220, 224–25 (2015).   
203 See, e.g., Benjamin D. Garber, Conceptualizing Visitation Resistance and Refusal in the 
Context of Parental Conflict, Separation, and Divorce, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 588, 588 (2007).   
204 See, e.g., William J. Austin et al., Benchbook for Assessing Parental Gatekeeping in 
Parenting Disputes:  Understanding the Dynamics of Gate Closing and Opening for the Best 
Interests of Children, 10 J. CHILD CUSTODY 1, 5 (2013).   
205 See, e.g., Janet R. Johnston et al., Is It Alienating Parenting, Role Reversal, or Child 
Abuse?  A Study of Children's Rejection of a Parent in Child Custody Disputes, 5 J. 
EMOTIONAL ABUSE 191, 206 (2005) (recognizing “a multi-factor explanation of 
children’s rejection of a parent after divorce”); Leslie M. Drozd & Nancy Williams 
Olesen, Is it Abuse, Alienation, and/or Estrangement? A Decision Tree, 1 J. CHILD 
CUSTODY 65, 67, 73–85 (2004) (describing multiple reasons a child may be estranged 
or less close with one parent, including poor parenting, absence, as well as abuse). 
206 William Bernet, Parental Alienation:  Misinformation Versus Fact, JUDGES’ J., 
Summer 2015, 23, 25 (describing the two concepts as "almost synonymous"); Sheila 
Pursglove, Asked and Answered:  Demosthenes Lorandos on Parental Alienation 
Syndrome, OAKLAND COUNTY LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 6, 2015), 
http://www.legalnews.com/oakland/1399575/ (discussing PAS and parental alienation 
interchangeably); JOAN S. MEIER, PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME AND PARENTAL 
ALIENATION: A RESEARCH REVIEW, NAT’L ONLINE RES. CTR. ON VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 7 (2013), https://vawnet.org/sites/default/files/materials/files/2016-
09/AR_PASUpdate.pdf (describing a case in which the evaluator seamlessly changed the 
label from PAS to PA without changing the analysis). 




B.  Alienation Theory in the Courts 
 
Notwithstanding the nuances in the literature, the absence of the word 
“syndrome” has not changed alienation’s use in court.207  Like PAS, 
alienation is routinely used in court to per se discredit abuse claims.208 PA 
labelling was responsible for 37% of the harmful outcomes in Silberg and 
Dallam’s case series; and when alternative terms embodying similar forms of 
pathologizing of mothers’ protective efforts were included, the percentage 
became 66%.209 Like PAS, but unlike the nuanced literature’s recognition 
that most “alienated” parents are partly responsible for their children’s 
estrangement,  the focus in court cases remains on the purportedlyh alienating 
parent. Finally, children’s legitimate reasons for resisting contact with one 
parent – recognized in the new scholarship - are rarely given much weight in 
court once alienation has been raised.   In fact, as was seen in the Study’s 
data, even where abuse is known and acknowledged, alienation findings often 
 
207 See Allison M. Nichols, Toward a Child-Centered Approach to Evaluating Claims of 
Alienation in High-Conflict Custody Disputes,112 MICH. L. REV. 663, 680 (2014) (“Expert 
witnesses may offer testimony strongly reminiscent of PAS without uttering the word 
‘syndrome.’”); Jodi Death, Claire Ferguson, & Kylie Burgess, Parental Alienation, 
Coaching and the Best Interests of the Child:  Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Family Court of Australia, CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT, August 2019, at 3 (while endeavoring 
to distinguish PAS and parental alienation courts utilize similar analyses including blaming 
mothers and rejecting child sexual abuse claims); JESS HILL, SEE WHAT YOU MADE ME 
DO 279 (2019) (fathers’ rights website advises fathers to avoid referencing PAS and speak 
instead of “brainwashing,” “extreme alignment,” or “alienation”); Smith, supra note 198, at 
86 (citing alienation proponent Richard Warshak’s references and support for both PAS and 
parental alienation); Meier, supra note 185 (explicating substantial overlap between PAS 
and PA). 
208 See Simon Lapierre & Isabel Côté, Abused Women and the Threat of Parental Alienation: 
Shelter Workers’ Perspectives,65 Child. & Youth Servs. Rev. 120, 125 (2016) (parental 
alienation is a “strategy . . . to overshadow male’s violence against women and children in 
society”); Smith, supra 202, at 84 (explaining that fathers assert PAS “much like an 
affirmative defense to disclaim a mother’s allegation [of abuse]”); 
Meier, supra note 23 (discussing five cases in which alienation was used to deny credible 
abuse claims). 
209 JOYANNA SILBERG ET AL., CRISIS IN FAMILY COURT: LESSONS FROM TURNED AROUND 
CASES. FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE 37 (2013), 
 http://www.protectiveparents.com/crisis-fam-court-lessons-turned-around-cases.pdf.  




supersede. In one case exemplifying the logical extreme of alienation 
thinking, the court responded to a child’s continued disclosures of his father’s 





210 Oates v. Oates, supra n. 184.   




1. Study Findings on Parental Alienation  
  
 The Study’s data confirm that crossclaims of alienation are powerful 
weapons against mothers’ abuse allegations.  Whereas in non-alienation 
cases, courts credited 40% of mothers’ abuse allegations overall, in alienation 
cases, they credited only 23%.  Child abuse allegations were believed on 
average 27% of the time in non-alienation cases, but in only 18% of alienation 
cases.211  Overall, when allegedly abusive fathers crossclaim alienation, 
courts (i) disbelieve mothers’ claims of abuse at 2.3 times the odds for cases 
without alienation (p<0.001, CI 1.6-3.1); and (ii) have almost 4 (3.8) times 
greater odds of disbelieving mothers’ claims of child abuse (p=0.002, CI 1.6-
8.8).212  
 
Custody losses followed suit. Among cases where mothers alleged 
abuse and there was no alienation crossclaim, 213  26% ended in a custody 
switch to the father accused of abuse.  However, when fathers crossclaimed 
alienation, maternal custody losses roughly doubled, to 50%.  Among 
mothers alleging child physical or sexual abuse, 29% lost custody in the non-
alienation cases; in the alienation cases, that rate also doubled, to 58%.214 
 
When a mother alleging abuse was found by the court to have 
committed alienation, 71% lost custody to the alleged abuser.  (The same is 
true for fathers.) When a court believed both that a father was abusive and a 
mother was alienating, 43% (6/14) switched custody from alienating mothers 
to abusive fathers. In other words, alienation outweighed violence.215   
 
These findings compel three important conclusions:  First, mothers’ 
child sexual abuse claims are nearly universally rejected when fathers 
crossclaim alienation.  Indeed, both this Study and a Canadian study 
 
211 Statistical Documentation.   
212 Id. 
213 Id. Since the Study relies solely on courts’ published opinions, it is possible that claims 
of alienation (or abuse) were made but not reported in the opinion.  However, it is likely that 
allegations that are not mentioned in an opinion were not deemed significant.   
214 Statistical Documentation.   
215 Statistical Documentation.   




produced virtually identical findings (whereas only one court believed child 
sexual abuse in the U.S. Study, in the Canadian study no sexual abuse claims 
were believed).216  
 
Second, alienation roughly doubles women’s disadvantage in cases 
where they allege a father has committed any type of abuse.  Despite the truth 
of contemporary alienation proponents’ assertion that alienation is not merely 
a mechanism for refuting abuse,217 the fact remains that it is particularly 
powerful when deployed against a mother alleging abuse.  
 
Third, while alienation proponents argue that alienation is not a 
gendered concept because women are also victims of parental alienation by 
fathers,218 an observation the Study’s findings support,219 the findings do 
indicate that in abuse cases, alienation is likely gendered. Overall, across all 
alienation cases (both with and without abuse claims), mothers had twice the 
odds of losing custody when accused of alienation compared to fathers (OR 
2.0, p=0.020, CI 1.1-3.5).220 Half (81/163) of all mothers accused of 
alienation lost custody to the fathers they accused of abuse, while only 29% 
(5/17) of fathers who were accused of alienation by the mother they accused 
of abuse lost custody to that mother.221   
 
In short, the Study’s findings strongly confirm not only that courts are 
generally resistant to accepting mothers’ claims of fathers’ abuse, especially 
child abuse, but that parental alienation potently intensifies these outcomes. 
These national data support the many anecdotal reports of alienation’s misuse 
 
216 Elizabeth Sheehy & Susan Boyd, Penalizing Women’s Fear: Intimate Partner Violence  
and Parental Alienation in Canadian Child Custody Cases, 42 J. SOC. WEL. & FAM. LAW  
80, 8 (2020) (none of twenty-eight child sexual abuse claims by mothers accepted).   
217 See note 179, supra.    
218 See, e.g., Johnston & Sullivan, supra n.  33 at 19–20.   
219 Statistical Documentation.   
220 Id.  
221 This difference was not statistically significant, likely because there were only seventeen 
cases where a father started with custody, accused the mother of abuse, and was accused of 
alienation.  Statistical Documentation.  A more comprehensive empirical analysis of gender 
bias will be revealed in a future paper.   




to deny credible abuse allegations and to punish mothers who raise them, 
many of which are deeply harmful.222 
 
C. Alienation’s Lack of Scientific Basis  
The troubling nature of alienation theory’s use in abuse cases is 
underlined by its lack of scientific support. Despite some proponents’ 
assertions to the contrary,223 a rigorous and honest review of the extant 
research by several leading alienation researchers concluded with admirable 
frankness that:  
There is a virtual absence of empirical studies on the 
differential diagnosis of alienation in children from other 
conditions that share similar features with parental alienation, 
especially realistic estrangement or justified rejection in 
response to parental abuse/neglect, significantly compromised 
parenting or the child being a witness to intimate partner 
violence. 224 
 
Buried in this verbiage is a startling admission:  Neither researchers nor 
practitioners have any objective, validated means of distinguishing between 
children resisting a parent for legitimate reason from those who have been 
 
222 See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text; U.S. Divorce Child Murder Data, supra 
n. 2.  Many alienation scholars seem content to dismiss the abuse critique as “extreme” or 
ideological, cf. sources cited supra n. 33, without bothering to address the question of 
whether alienation is in fact being misused to deny credible abuse.  Even the first-ever 
scholarly discussion of alienation “false positives” conspicuously fails to address its use to 
deny abuse.  Warshak, supra n. 33.   
223 See e.g., Brianna Pepiton et al., Is Parental Alienation Disorder a Valid Concept? Not 
According to Scientific Evidence. A Review of “Parental Alienation, DSM-5, and ICD-11, by 
William Bernet,” 21 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 244, 248–52 (2012) (critiquing Bernet’s claim 
that alienation is scientifically supported and noting that his book making the assertion 
contains only two studies—both dissertations, and neither proving Parental Alienation 
Disorder —but is filled with stories, movies, television shows, and non-peer-reviewed books 
and articles). 
224 Michael Saini et al., Empirical Studies of Alienation, in PARENTING PLAN EVALUATIONS: 
APPLIED RESEARCH FOR FAMILY COURT 2E, 423 (Drozd, Saini & Olesen, eds., 2016).  See 
also Rebecca M. Thomas & James T. Richardson, Parental Alienation Syndrome: 30 Years 
on and Still Junk Science, Judges’ J., Summer 2015, at 22, 22.  




illegitimately influenced by the other parent (i.e., “alienated”).225 The 
reviewers also found there was a dearth of generalizable, scientifically valid 
studies: Most merely describe “clinical opinions or personal impressions.”226 
 
 The absence of genuine scientific support for the alienation theory is 
compounded by the emergence of credible research refuting it.  University of 
Virginia scholar Robert Emery and colleague Jenna Rowen studied college 
students who reported having been subjected as children to their custodial 
parent’s denigration of the other parent.  Rather than finding that parental 
denigration encouraged the child to disrespect or dislike the other parent, this 
study found precisely the opposite:  Denigrating behaviors by a parent had a 
“boomerang” effect - that is, the children turned against the alienating parent 
more than the denigrated parent.227 They conclude:   
 
the hypotheses and predictions consistent with the alienation 
construct were unsupported. The overwhelming evidence 
suggests that when parents denigrate the other parent, parental 
alienation and rejection does not result.228 
 
 Nonetheless, the alienation concept retains wide allegiance from 
much of the family court world.  In fact, the previously-cited scholarly 
reviewers of the research, while noting the lack of credible science, also 
emphasize the broad professional consensus among family court practitioners 
about the prevalence of parental alienation and professionals’ ability to 
identify such behaviors in cases.229  They do not discuss Emery and Rowen’s 
research.  
 
225 Saini, et al., supra note 496, at 417–18, 376 (“[n]o validated and reliable instruments exist 
to distinguish [realistic estrangement] from alienation cases.”). 
226 Id. at 375. 
227 Jenna Rowen & Robert Emery, Parental Denigration Reports Across Parent-Child 
Dyads: Divorced Parents Underreport Denigration Behaviors Compared to Children, 16 J. 
CHILD CUSTODY 197, 207 (2019) (“The initial work we have completed on parental 
denigrations calls into question basic suppositions about parental alienation.”).   
228 Jenna Rowen & Robert Emery, Examining Parental Denigration Behaviors of Co-
Parents as Reported by Young Adults and Their Association with Parent–Child Closeness, 3 
COUPLE & FAM. PSYCHOL. 165, 175 (2014).   
229 Saini et al., supra note 224, at 418. 





 Alienation has also been exceedingly difficult to challenge in court.  
While PAS was ruled inadmissible by a handful of courts,230 no family court 
has created precedent addressing the admissibility of mere “alienation,” 
despite multiple attempts by capable lawyers. Even appellate courts have 
avoided such challenges when they have been brought.231   
 
The staying power of alienation– and its many synonyms and 
variants232 - can be seen as a reflection of family courts’ eagerness to doubt 
or reject mothers’ and children’s abuse claims in custody battles. Alienation, 
especially when propounded by neutral court-appointees, provides a 
plausible, quasi-scientific rationale for discrediting claims that fathers are 
abusive or dangerous, while providing a reason to criticize mothers who bring 
such claims. To be clear, this article is not suggesting that one parent’s efforts 
to undermine the other parent’s relationship with the children should be of no 
concern to family courts.  Rather, as is explained further below, it urges that 
courts’ use of the “alienation” concept be cabined to avoid its misuse to deny 
credible abuse claims that have real implications for children’s safety. 
 
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
 
 
230 See cases cited supra note 193. 
231 DV LEAP has handled several appeals challenging the admissibility and misuse of 
alienation to deny abuse claims by a mother and/or child.  Every appellate court declined to 
address the issue.  See Licata v. Licata, 859 A.2d 691 (N.J. 2004), 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17FLNEf3IeEBHvKQjad-KA-ERw7RU6CxT/view; 
McRoberts v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty, 2012 WL 2317714, at **10–12 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 19, 2012) 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zIUr686NWFChEVKA2TZJHtLMgd4eHYxQ/view 
(unpublished); Oates v. Oates, 2010 Ark. App. 346, at 6, 2010 WL 1609411, at *6;  In 
2019, New York’s highest court declined without explanation to review a carefully 
developed challenge to the misuse of parental alienation, supported by a broad spectrum of 
organizations.  See Order, E.V. v. R.V., (N.Y. Court of Appeals, May 2, 2019) (on file with 
author). 
232 See, e.g., Marsha Kline Pruett & Leslie M. Drozd, Not Just Alienation: Resistance, 
Rejection, Reintegration, and the Realities of Troubled Parent-Child Relationships, ASS’N 
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. ANN. CONF., slide 5 (2019) (listing different terms/concepts) (on 
file with author). 




The foregoing discussion indicates that protective parents’ and their 
advocates’ increasingly urgent calls for reform should be heeded.  The new 
data verify that not only are women’s reports of domestic violence being 
ignored, even – and especially - child abuse claims are being rejected and 
punished with loss of custody.  Children’s subjection to ongoing abuse, and 
in extreme cases, horrific deaths233 at the hands of a father who was reported 
to be dangerous but to whom the court awarded unsupervised access, is both 
unacceptable and completely unnecessary.  While it is possible that some of 
the mothers who lost custody in the Study had not accurately reported abuse, 
heeding the warnings of the majority of protective parents who do can keep 
children alive and safe.  What does this mean for both the practice and theory 
of family law? 
  
First, academic understanding of family law – and the education of 
future family lawyers and judges – has been missing a significant piece of the 
picture.  Family law scholarship and teaching should better integrate the 
reality of family abuse – both its commonality and its common denial by 
authorities.  In particular, the myth that family courts respond protectively to 
family abuse allegations must be punctured so that family lawyers with 
protective-parent clients can know what to expect and become prepared to 
handle such cases.234  Scholarly co-parenting proposals should be expected 
to explain how greater co-parenting emphasis in courts can be achieved 
without increasing problems for families experiencing abuse.  Weiner’s 
Parent-Partners book includes a positive example of this when she argues that 
protection orders should be broadened to cover psychological abuse between 
 
233 See supra note 32; Nikita Stewart, She Went to Court to Save Her Three-Year-Old 
Daughter. Days Later, the Child Was Dead, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2019) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/nyregion/queens-car-fire-toddler-death.html.  
234 It is an open secret among domestic violence lawyers that most fee-paid family lawyers 
do not adequately understand either domestic violence or child abuse and are ill-equipped to 
litigate these issues affirmatively, especially preparing to combat the culture of denial and 
alienation.  After all, opposing abuse allegations is far easier.  Some are aware enough to 
withdraw from a case once child sexual abuse becomes an issue—others stumble through, 
often in ways that prejudice future attempts to secure safety.  Education, training and support 
on family abuse for private domestic relations lawyers is a compelling need.  




co-parents – to fulfill co-parents’ “duty not to abuse,” and to support decent 
co-parental relationships.235 
 
 With regard to the courts and the law, the remainder of this article 
proposes two changes.236  First, the law must outlaw the use of alienation 
theory (or its synonyms) as a reason to discount abuse allegations.237  While 
judges will always need to determine the truth or falsity of litigants’ and 
children’s allegations about a parent, parental alienation’s quasi-scientific 
veneer encourages evaluators and courts to ignore and reject abuse claims 
without proper assessment, and fuels negative judgments of the alleging 
parent.  Alienation acts as a thumb on the scale against attending to abuse 
allegations – it must be removed. 
 
 Second, state law should explicitly recognize that there will always 
be indeterminate cases,238 and offer a path forward which does not ignore risk 
to children.  Perhaps understandably, custody judges often react to abuse 
claims as though they are adjudicating a crime, where non-conviction means 
acquittal.  But where indeterminacy should lead to acquittal in the criminal 
realm, the same is not true in the determination of children’s best interests in 
custody litigation:  Here, the perpetrator does not face a loss of liberty, and 
the potential child victim faces a risk of ongoing abuse (or worse), despite the 
presence of a safe parent.  Protecting children’s welfare should take 
precedence in this context.  States should thus amend their custody laws to 
require courts to respond to indeterminacy about abuse by following a 
 
235 WEINER, supra n. 110 at 333.   
236 I do not discuss amending statutes to reduce emphasis on shared parenting.  While such 
amendments could support needed changes, the cultural, normative emphasis on shared 
parenting is likely to be more significant than statutory language.   
237 As noted above and below, this paper and this author make no recommendations 
regarding the use of the parental alienation theory in non-abuse cases.   
238 I thank University of Minnesota Law Professor June Carbone for the seeds of this idea.  
Alienation scholars Johnston and Sullivan also emphasize indeterminate cases in their newest 
article, but their approach is vulnerable to the conflation of abuse and alienation, and, 
contrary to the proposal herein, explicitly rejects emphasizing children’s voices.  Johnston 
& Sullivan, supra n. 33.   




“middle path”239 which respects the possible risk while also seeking to heal 
any unnecessary rift between parent and child to the extent possible.   
 
As a result of an increasing number of child murders by parents given 
access by family courts over the objections of a protective parent, a unanimous 
Congressional resolution on Child Safety in Family Courts,240 the new data 
described herein, and long-term advocacy by anti-abuse advocates, several state 
lawmakers and advocates for children’s safety are currently revisiting state 
custody laws.241  Now is an auspicious time for developing new policies and 
practices for family courts.   
 
A.  Constraining Reliance on Alienation and Like Theories  
 
Concern about parental alienation being used to deny mothers’ and 
children’s abuse allegations has reached international critical mass with the 2020 
publication of a European journal’s Special Issue covering 8 different countries; 
it is also reflected in a recent United Nations-affiliated call for governments to 
 
239 The “middle way” is a Buddhist principle which encourages people to avoid all-or-
nothing thinking and advocacy.  See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Middle_Way 
240 See Expressing the Sense of Congress That Child Safety Is the First Priority of Custody 
and Visitation Adjudications, and That State Courts Should Improve Adjudications of 
Custody Where Family Violence Is Alleged, H.R. Con. Res. 72, 115th Cong. (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/72/titles.  The 
Resolution’s unanimous adoption by the House of Representatives in 2018 was the 
culmination of years of education and advocacy by a small group of “protective parent 
advocates” and parents whose children had been killed after a family court failure.  
241 For instance, Connecticut, reeling from the presumed murder of a protective mother (and 
more recently, the suspect-father’s suicide), has held a series of hearings on family court has 
and is currently considering An Act Concerning Court Proceedings Involving Allegations of 
Family Violence and Domestic Abuse, S.B. 442, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 
2020), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2020/TOB/s/pdf/2020SB-00442-R00-SB.PDF.  In 
Pennsylvania, Kayden’s Law was named after a seven-year-old murdered by her father 
during a court-ordered visit.  Kayden’s Law: Bucks County Lawmakers Introduce Bills to 
Ensure Children in Custody Disputes are Protected, BUCKS LOCAL NEWS (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.buckslocalnews.com/news/kayden-s-law-bucks-county-lawmakers-introduce-
bills-to-ensure/article_981e4d38-e903-11e9-a3b9-8f24a06c0ab5.html.  New York is reeling 
from multiple horrific child murders after courts rejected mothers’ pleas for safety, and 
legislative reforms are under discussion.  See supra note 32.  




remedy the problem.242  The following discussion spells out a balanced and 
thoughtful approach to constraining the misuse of alienation theory. 243 It should 
be noted that this proposal does not seek to eliminate the concept of alienation 
completely – affirmative evidence of parental alienation behaviors can be 
considered when not used to deny abuse.     
 
Statutes should require that courts:  
i. Determine abuse allegations first, before reaching other best-interest factors 
or considerations.  This ensures that “friendly parent” or alienation-type 
considerations do not distort an objective, fact-based judgment on abuse 
claims. 
ii. In determining the validity of abuse allegations, only experts in the alleged 
form(s) of abuse should be heard from.  As several of the case narratives 
contained in this article indicate, courts often allow non-expert evaluators or 
GALs to opine negatively on abuse allegations. Opinions about abuse should 
require expertise in the type of abuse alleged. 
iii. Once family abuse by one parent is found, alienation claims against the other 
protective parent should be excluded.244 Alienation is too regularly used to deny 
abuse or its effects.  If abuse is recognized to have occurred in a family, 
alienation by a non-offending parent should not be considered.  
 
242 See Sheehy & Lapierre, supra note 25; Dubrovka Simonovic, et al., Intimate Partner 
Violence is an Essential Factor in the Determination of Child Custody, Say Women’s Rights 
Experts, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/SR/StatementVAW_Custody.pdf 
(international consortium of leading experts on violence against women working with the 
United Nations recommend that nation-states should “explicitly prohibit, during the 
investigations to determine the existence of violence, evidence based on the discrediting 
testimony on the basis of alleged Parental Alienation Syndrome. . . . Accusations of parental 
alienation by abusive fathers against mothers must be considered as a continuation of power 
and control by state agencies and actors, including those deciding on child custody.”). 
243 See Meier, supra n. 23 (containing a more detailed discussion of the proposal). 
244 This restriction distinguishes this proposal from that of Johnston and Sullivan, supra n. 
33, who advocate assessment of both alienation and abuse and other parenting concerns all 
at the same time.  As I have explained elsewhere, cf. Meier, supra n.23, employing this type 
of “multi-variate” assessment cannot and will not rein in the misuses of alienation to deny 
abuse and its effects on a family.     




iv. Where abuse allegations  are  not  confirmed,  the  allegations themselves 
should not be treated as evidence of alienation.  Alienation should not be 
inferred from abuse allegations.  It should stand or fall on its own.  
v. Alienation claims should be considered only if all other "natural" reasons 
for the child's hostility to the parent (such as affinity, development, or the 
disfavored parent's own conduct) have been ruled out.  Courts and evaluators 
need to be guided to avoid leaping to alienation and blaming a preferred parent 
without ruling out myriad other reasons children may have difficulties with a 
parent after separation.245 
vi. Only conscious intent and specific behaviors should be deemed 
alienating conduct. Speculation about unconscious transmission of 
“alienating” thoughts should not be considered.  As some of the narratives 
herein demonstrate, courts have been remarkably accepting of speculations that 
a mother has not deliberately, but unconsciously alienated her child from the 
father.246  There is no scientific basis for this – and it derives from Gardner’s 
PAS.247  
vii. Remedies for confirmed alienation should be limited to healing the child's 
relationship with the alienated parent.  No treatment requiring separation 
from a non-abusive parent to whom the child is bonded or forced change 
of custody should be ordered. Particularly given the ever-present risk of 
 
245 See Johnston & Sullivan, supra n. 33 at 26 (describing many different factors and 
dynamics that come into play in fueling a parent-child relationship breach).    
246 In addition to the narratives in this article, I am familiar with other cases that have turned 
on imputations of unconscious alienation.  In one case, the court explicitly found that the 
mother was not coaching the child but suggested that the child might be inventing sexual 
abuse because she "senses her mother's dislike for her father." Order, p. 15, CW v. EF, Case 
No. DR 757-01, IF 2261-02 (2007) (on file with author). Such a theory could negate all child 
abuse allegations in all cases, since inter-parental hostility can be inferred in most custody 
litigation. See also Brief of Appellant Rosalind Blount, in Blount v. Grier at 31, 18-FM-624 
(on file with author) (court suspects mother’s anxiety unconsciously alienated son). Some 
alienation specialists have wisely warned evaluators against "attempt[ing] to guess at 
someone's motivation or . . .[posit] some unconscious underlying family dynamic." Drozd 
& Olesen, supra note 202, at 80. 
247 GARDNER, A GUIDE, supra note 157, at126, 128 (“In other cases, however, subconscious 
and unconscious factors are operative, especially projection,” and treating father as 
incompetent can “serve as a mechanism for dealing with one’s own unconscious desires to 
inflict harm on the baby”).   




error when courts seek to untangle family relationships and force changes, 
remedies such as a forced custody switch, which intrinsically inflict 
psychological trauma on children, should not be entertained.  Currently, 
most intensive court-ordered “reunification” treatment programs require 
this,248 based on the brainwashing theory underlying the alienation label.  
While meaningful data is not yet available, anecdotal reports of such 
programs’ torment of and harshness toward children, as well as indefinite 
removals from their caring parent, are extremely troubling.249 
Provisions such as the foregoing could easily be incorporated into a 
state’s statute; they could also be embodied in court rules, or at minimum, 
in judicial guidelines or a Bench Book.  (The latter, of course, would be 
harder to enforce.)  Pieces of the above guidelines are already embodied 
in legislation pending in Pennsylvania.250  With sufficient education about 
the Study, citation to House Concurrent Resolution 72,251 and detailed 
reports on children murdered by a parent as the result of a family court 
access order, lawmakers, advocates, experts, and lawyers should be well-
positioned to advance this proposal. 
 
B.  Legislating for Indeterminacy 
 
 The discussion in Part III of courts’ denial of the reality of family 
abuse and its implications for custody suggests that fundamental change in 
court professionals’ attitudes will not be rapid.  Indeed, this problem – and 
 
248 Jean Mercer, Are intensive parental alienation treatments effective and safe for children 
and adolescents?  16:1 Journal of Child Custody 67 (2019).   
249 One child described her experience at a treatment program thus: “[C]aptive is a good 
way to describe it. I felt watched all the time. I felt trapped.”  Bitter Custody, REVEAL 
(Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.revealnews.org/episodes/bitter-custody/.  She and her brother 
“couldn’t leave the program until they said that their dad had brainwashed them [against 
the mother they said was emotionally abusive].”  Id.  Another had written the judge stating 
“[m]y mom screamed at me so much I started getting panic attacks. I wanted to kill myself 
just to make the pain go away.”  Id.  She was ordered to attend another treatment program, 
supposedly for five days.  Id.  Her stay lasted for 10 months, costing over $200,000.  Id.  
She was not allowed to have any contact with the father and brothers she loved until she 
aged out of the court’s jurisdiction.  Id.  See Dallam and Silberg, supra n. 109. 
250 See Kayden’s Law, supra note 241.     
251 An Act Concerning Court Proceedings Involving Allegations of Family Violence and 
Domestic Abuse, S.B. 442, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2020), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2020/TOB/s/pdf/2020SB-00442-R00-SB.PDF. 




tragic stories – have been in the public eye to some extent for decades,252 but, 
like other “inconvenient truths,” they have also been suppressed. 253   
While the long-term battle to challenge family courts’ denial has yet 
to succeed, the #MeToo movement creates new momentum for change.  
While as previously noted, the movement has not yet penetrated the courts – 
especially the family courts – it is ushering in a new social consciousness that 
may eventually be felt there as well.  Society – and the courts – are in 
transition, and there is a need for a transitional approach that invites more 
meaningful attention to abuse, without requiring a “feminist transformation.”  
Moreover, there will always need to be an approach for cases involving abuse 
allegations that are not resolved with certainty. 
 
 One reason for family courts’ resistance to abuse allegations is courts’ 
understandable instinct to treat abuse allegations as criminal, which generates 
an automatic protectiveness toward the rights of the “accused,” and an 
intuitive (if not explicit) demand for greater proof than the regular civil 
preponderance standard.254  Another dynamic likely imported from the 
 
252 See, e.g., PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATTLE FOR CHILDREN AND 
CUSTODY (2d ed. 2011).  
253 Women on Trial, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_on_Trial_(film) 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (describing 1992 HBO documentary that followed a group of 
women who lost custody in family court to abusive fathers and that was pulled after one 
night due to lawsuit by judge); see also Psychologist Loses Libel Suit Over HBO 
Documentary, REPS. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM PRESS (Oct. 19, 1998), 
https://www.rcfp.org/psychologist-loses-libel-suit-over-hbo-documentary/.  See also 
Michael Getler, A Little About Me, A Lot About “Breaking the Silence,” PBS: 
OMBUDSMAN COLUMN (DEC. 2, 2005, 4:11PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/ombudsman/2005/12/introduction_and_breaking_the_silence.html 
(quoting review describing the film as depicting “the impact of domestic violence on 
children and the recurring failings of family courts across the country to protect them from 
their abusers”).  Attacks on the film by fathers’ rights advocates were so vociferous that 
PBS produced another documentary to appease them.  Press Release, PBS, PBS Statement 
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criminal context is courts’ apparent assumption that if abuse allegations are 
not sufficiently proven, they must then be considered untrue.  While this may 
be technically correct in a criminal case, in a custody case, the issue is not 
guilt or innocence, but future child well-being.  Where child safety is at issue, 
treating uncertain abuse claims as false puts the risk of error squarely on the 
child.  In a custody adjudication, where children’s well-being is legally and 
morally the priority, defaulting to “false” in cases of uncertainty 
inappropriately subjects children to unnecessary risk.  Moreover, treating 
these cases as a zero-sum game between the child and the accused parent is a 
recipe for further harm to one or both parties. Crafting a “middle way” 
response for cases of uncertainty is thus essential, albeit challenging.   
 
 What should courts do in cases that are indeterminate – whether due 
to a court’s resistance to believing abuse, or due to actual lack of sufficient 
evidence?  If, as courts and court professionals regularly assert, one priority 
is relationship repair, a child-centric approach255 would build on the 
guidelines described in Part A above, thus:     
i. Children’s negative feelings about one parent would be given the benefit of 
the doubt and not be presumed to have been caused by the other parent they 
love and trust.  Indeterminacy means that abuse claims may be true, which 
means that exposure to the abuser could re-traumatize the child.  Without proper 
trauma-sensitive and child-centric therapy, a premature push for reunification 
can magnify the trauma of being helpless and overpowered by an abusive 
parent.256   
ii. The resistant or frightened child would be given a therapist with expertise in 
trauma and the relevant type of alleged abuse.  The therapy would not 
necessarily aim to prove or disprove the alleged abuse but would prioritize 
working with the child and their feelings and ascertaining whether there are any 
conditions that might make parent-child contact non-traumatic and emotionally 
as well as physically safe for the child.  A potentially rich modality for this type 
of therapy is play therapy, which does not require a child to verbalize what has 
 
(describing family courts treating cases involving child abuse allegations as though they are 
criminal cases). 
255 Thanks to June Carbone for elevating this approach in my thinking. 
256 Madelyn Milchman, Scientific Issues Related to Reunification Therapy vs. Reunification 
Treatment (Mar. 4, 2020) (unpublished report, on file with author).  




happened to them or even how they feel, but often allows them to use the animals 
or other figures, drawings, sand trays, etc, to discuss what is happening with the 
play figures without requiring them to say in words what happened to 
themselves.257  “The decision to expose a child to an alleged abuser should be 
made [only] on the basis of clear and scientifically validated criteria for 
differentiating abused from alienated children.”  As child sexual abuse expert 
Madelyn Milchman has stated, no such valid criteria exist, and existing criteria 
for “diagnosing” alienation are too similar to behaviors of children who have 
been abused, making indeterminate cases unsafe cases for forced 
reunification.258 
iii. The disfavored parent would be given a therapist with expertise in parenting 
therapy, and enough expertise in family abuse to understand the counter-
intuitive dynamics, and the ways children, adult survivors, and perpetrators 
may present.  The purpose of this therapy would be to work with this parent on 
any aspects of their parenting behavior which they are able to acknowledge may 
have impaired their relationship with his child, and to work toward repairing 
those injuries to the parent-child relationship for which s/he can accept 
responsibility.  An aspect of this process might include helping the accused 
parent understand and accept how the child feels, even if the allegations are not, 
in his/her view, accurate.  Another aspect might require challenging such a 
parent’s desire to blame the problems in their relationship with the child on the 
preferred parent.  The core premise of such work would be that, regardless of 
what is true about the past, repairing the relationship will require some maturity 
and selflessness on the part of the accused parent, and a willingness to sacrifice 
their ego-defensiveness in the interests of rebuilding a positive relationship with 
the child without damage.259     
iv. If these therapeutic processes clarify that abuse (or other destructive 
parenting) did in fact occur, the court’s orders should respond to that reality 
 
257 See Sue C. Bratton, Dee Ray, Tammy Rhine, & Leslie Jones, The Efficacy of Play Therapy 
with Children: A Meta-Analytic Review of Treatment Outcomes, 36 PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 
376, 376 (2005) (Play therapy is “equally effective across age, gender, and presenting issue,” 
as children “use play materials to directly or symbolically act out feelings, thoughts, and 
experiences that they are not able to meaningfully express through words”).  
258 Madelyn Milchman, Scientific Issues Related to Reunification Therapy in Cases with 
Parental Alienation vs. Child Sexual Abuse Allegations 8–9 (Sept. 19, 2019) (on file with 
author).   
259 Id.  




and ensure that the child’s physical and psychological safety are protected.  
However, this does not mean that there should never be contact between the 
abusive parent and the child.  Contact should be a function of the child’s wishes 
and their therapist’s determination of what the child is ready for.  Some children 
want contact with fathers who have abused them or their mother.260  Allowing 
some kind of relationship - even if limited - to exist can help a child survivor 
come to terms with their experience and learn to see their abusive parent in a 
more complex and full light.  If their abusive parent works on themself, allowing 
contact could provide them with the apology and acknowledgment of their hurt 
for which most abuse survivors long.261  On the other hand, if the child does not 
want to see that parent under any circumstances, their feelings, as a matter of 
justice and mental health, should be respected.262     
v. If the therapeutic processes do not clarify whether abuse did in fact occur, the 
court should still be guided by the child therapist’s recommendations as to 
what would be best for the child.  The child’s well-being must be the priority of 
a custody/visitation proceeding where a child’s “best interests” must be 
determined. Fairness to even a falsely accused parent should not supersede a 
child’s needs.  In fact, a falsely accused parent is more likely to eventually regain 
a relationship with their child if the child’s needs are respected, rather than 
rejected as “wrong,” with the child subjected to coercion - the usual modus 
operandi in alienation-driven proceedings. 263  It is likely, albeit not guaranteed, 
that a productive therapeutic relationship with the child will help the child move 
toward a healthier and more reality-based perspective on the avoided parent and 
 
260 Peled, supra note 65 (“Many children of abusive men seem to care deeply for their 
fathers and wish they could have a gratifying relationship with them.”).   
261 See Arifa Akbar, Review, The Apology by Eve Ensler–My Father Who Abused Me, 
GUARDIAN (June 12, 2019, 2:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/jun/12/the-apology-eve-ensler-review (Ensler 
imagines and details her father’s apology). 
262 Janet R. Johnston & Judith Roth Goldman, Outcomes of Family Counseling Interventions 
with Children Who Resist Visitation:  An Addendum to Friedlander and Walters (2010), 48 
FAM. CT. REV. 112, 113 (Nineteen percent of post-custody-litigation counseling population 
continued to refuse all contact with parents who were alcoholic, abusive or subtly 
emotionally manipulative and lacking in “empathy or respect for them as a person.”). 
263 Id.  (children forced into extended reunification treatment, “were, as young adults, 
contemptuous and blamed the court or rejected parent for putting them through this ordeal”). 




may, as described in iii above, lead to the child’s greater willingness to have 
contact with that parent.264 
vi. The preferred parent should be worked with by the child’s therapist and/or an 
independent therapist to understand the child’s feelings and process, and to 
aid the parent to support the child’s growth and healing.  A part of this work 
may include helping the parent come to terms with their own feelings toward 
the accused parent, and to separate them from the child’s possible need for a 
relationship with that parent.  The preferred parent should not be told they are a 
liar, pathological, or not in reality, merely because their abuse allegations have 
not been validated to the satisfaction of the court.  However, they, like a parent 
who feels falsely accused, should be expected to prioritize their children’s needs 
and interests, where they diverge from their own.     
 
 While the process outlined here requires substantial trust in and 
deference to mental health professionals, family courts already rely 
extensively on mental health professionals – but on the wrong ones, who lack 
abuse expertise and are biased toward alienation labels.265 This proposal 
urges that – if our goal is to repair a damaged parent-child relationship in a 
case with abuse allegations - we replace forensic custody evaluators’ opinions 
with the opinions of abuse and parenting experts.266  This strategy alone 
would help prioritize children’s needs and safety over fathers’ or mothers’ 
rights and shared parenting ideals.  Given the high costs in dollars, time, and 
traumatic stress already embedded in our current alienation-driven court 
processes, there is little to lose and much to gain from shifting the paradigm 
in responding to abuse allegations.  As amplified above, this does not mean 
accepting all such allegations as true, but it does mean taking them seriously 
enough to not dismiss them out of hand, and to shift the current emphasis on 
 
264 Id.  (among young adults who had been estranged from a separated parent when younger, 
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265 Saunders, supra n. 76.  
266 Such experts should be qualified based on their training and experience acquired in non-
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“reunification” therapy which dismisses abuse claims to therapy that operates 
more open-mindedly with regard to the potential truth of abuse allegations, 
so long as they have not been ruled out.   
 
C.  Anticipated Objections 
 
 The primary objection to the above guidelines will likely be from 
alienation proponents or those who bring a bias toward distrusting women’s 
and children’s allegations of a father’s abusive or destructive conduct.  While 
the guidelines’ emphases on taking children’s feelings and reports seriously 
are unlikely to satisfy such skeptics, I offer two responses.  First, children’s 
feelings and experiences must be key to any resolution that aims to protect 
children’s well-being and to heal parent-child relationships.267 Whether or 
not a child is “rational” or correct in a court’s view, relationship repair cannot 
be accomplished by coercion.  While forced “reunification” gives rejected 
parents physical possession of their children, it does so at huge cost:  First, 
many supposedly alienated children are cut off indefinitely from the parent 
they love and they believe is protecting them.  This ironically cures 
“alienation” by imposing an equivalent or greater destruction of a parent-
child relationship, causing presumably even more psychological damage to 
the child.268 Second, parents who are “reunified” with their children by force 
rarely benefit long-term, because the failure to respect children’s feelings and 
needs turns many such children against that parent.269  It should not take a 
specialist to recognize that healthy, positive parent-child relationships cannot 
 
267 See, e.g., BEVERLY JAMES, TREATING TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN: NEW INSIGHTS 
AND CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS 127 (1989) (“The child’s feelings and concerns about 
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own welfare.  
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WieqVBgZYcB2B0AxOmow0WCMu4zy7eIWfQD-VMAwGkORks  
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to surgical removal of a body part without anesthesia . . . [and may] threaten psychic integrity 
of both parent and child, inducing panic and despair.”  Johnston & Sullivan, supra note 33 
at 30 note11.   
269 Johnston & Goldman, supra note 268. 




be built on force and coercion, and must make room for children’s genuine 
feelings.  The alienation model, which employs coercion and denial of 
children’s felt experiences and feelings, at minimum inflicts psychological 
harm on children by taking them away from a loving parent and forcing them 
to live with one they hate or fear,  prioritizing an accused parent’s “rights” or 
desires over the child’s felt needs.270   
 
 A second objection may be that the proposal calls for too much court 
reliance on still more mental health professionals.271 I sympathize with this 
concern.  My answer is simply this:  If, as now, courts insist on repairing 
relationship breaches between a child and a parent after separation or divorce, 
then they should rely on the appropriate mental health professionals to 
accomplish this goal in a healthy and respectful manner. However, in my 
view it would not be unreasonable for courts and lawmakers to conclude that 
they are not institutionally suited to such a goal, and that courts should instead 
strive to “do no harm.”  In that case, a more modest goal might mean offering 
referrals, but resisting the urge to mandate therapeutic interventions, and 
leaving children in the care of the parent they love and trust. This stance 
would mean leaving the future of a parent-child relationship to the parent and 
child, after the child becomes independent.  Research suggests that most 
estranged children do return and seek reconciliation with a formerly rejected 
parent.272 Whether that effort is rewarded depends on the strengths and 
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271 See, e.g., Scott & Emery, supra note 73 at 71, 92–100 (criticizing courts’ reliance on 
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This article presents what may be an unwelcome description of how 
our nation’s family courts are handling cases involving abuse claims by 
women and children.  But the many different sources confirming this picture 
should compel both scholars and practitioners to grapple with the common 
realities faced by abuse survivors in our court system.  Reckoning with 
courts’ denial of family abuse and reification of shared parenting is necessary 
if we are to devise methods to better protect children and ensure that shared 
parenting remains in its place – in non-abusive families. Hopefully, this 
article will inspire that reckoning in all three realms:  judicial, policy, and 
academic.  The risks and the harms to children and their loving parents in 
these cases have been borne by too many for too long.  We can and must do 
better.   
